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Statutory Violations and Equitable 
Discretion 
Zygmunt J.B. Platert 
Equity, that ancient and amiable dowager of Anglo-American law, 
often appears to have ambled through the twentieth century free of the 
stress and strains that have belabored the common law. A closer analy-
sis of the practice and logic of equity in the modern statutory context, 
however, undercuts that appearance of immutability. The resulting re-
casting of equitable doctrines has important implications, not only for 
equity theory, but also for contemporary legal analysis of administra-
tive law, the relationship between courts and legislatures, and modern 
pluralistic democracy.' 
Today's equity treatises nevertheless remain largely grounded in 
the classic common law litigation setting? In part, no doubt, this is 
because equity, unlike the common law, has rarely been subjected to 
direct, specific reforms. While the common law has absorbed major 
dislocations in its settled doctrines-through judge-made revolutions 
like those in products liability and modern landlord-tenant law and 
statutory retoolings like the Uniform Commerical Code~quity, as a 
peculiarly procedural assemblage of remedy doctrines, has sustained 
t Visiting Professor, Boston College Law School (Professor after Sept. 1, 1982); Professor 
of Law, Wayne State University. A.B. 1965, Princeton University; J.D. 1968, Yale University; 
LL.M. 1974, University of Michigan. This Article belongs to that species of academic work which 
derives from prior litigation efforts. The issue analyzed here first arose in the course of the au-
thor's litigation in TVA v. Hill, 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 
1977), qff'd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (the Tellico Dam case). It is hoped, however, that the Article 
avoids the shortcomings of the genre by exploring theories of equity far beyond the scope of the 
Hill litigation, by extensive rethinking in the nonadversarial context of academia, and by the 
passage of time. A number of helpful colleagues have contributed to the shaping of this piece, 
among whom Robert Abrams, Irene Berkey, Mary Ann Glendon, Arthur Lombard, William 
Pierce, Joseph Sax, and Richard Sullivan deserve special thanks, with none of the blame for errors 
that remain. 
I. The analysis here presented concerns itself primarily with the federal statutory context 
but applies equally to the enforcement of state statutes, since it is based on distinctions drawn 
from traditional equity cases and general principles of separation of powers. 
2. E.g., D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 24 nn.2-3 (1973). Modem equity treatises do, of course, rec-
ognize the existence of statutes, but do not address the extent to which those statutes qualitatively 
change equity practice. See, e.g., o. FISS, INJUNCTIONS chs. I (1)(E), 2, 3 (1972); 7 J. MOORE, 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~~ 65.18(3), fi5.33-.140 (2d ed. 1980) (noting that statutes declare the 
public interest, which is part of the courts' equitable concern, and that in some statutory cases 
courts enjoin statutory violations, and in others they do not. The treatise does not analyze the 
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few basic changes. To be sure, modem statutes and twentieth century 
conditions have cast equity's substantive jurisdictions in the areas of 
divorce, trusts, and decedent's estates into new forms, but even there 
the judicial flexibility that is the essence of equity lies relatively undis-
turbed.3 When judges seek precedential authority for modem tort, 
contract, and property cases, they only rarely find it relevant to cite 
cases from a hundred or even fifty years ago. For equity cases, how-
ever, the nineteenth century is still thought to provide relevant 
guidance.4 
In larger part, however, the equity treatises' nonstatutory focus is 
attributable to a simple failure to take full account of modem govern-
mental processes. Modem times-the vast complexities and conse-
quences of a corporate economy, space-age technology, the legislative 
and administrative processes of the regulatory state-have altered the 
workings of equity in modem court practice even if the rhetoric of 
courts and scholars remains largely unchanged. It is time that our 
analysis and understanding of equitable doctrines be conformed to 
their reality, especially in the context of modem statutory law. 
To analyze equity in the modem statutory setting is to tread on the 
toes of one of the most venerable formulas of equitable jurisprudence: 
that an appeal to equity is always an appeal to a court's discretion to 
balance the equities. But this maxim, an accurate description of the 
role of equity in the classic common law cases,s is simply not an accu-
rate description of its role in the face of statutory commands. 
This Article examines the role of equitable discretion in the mod-
em statutory context. It begins in Part I with a proposition that can be 
as unsettling to trained legal minds as it is self-evident to those without 
the benefit of a legal education: that a court has no discretion or au-
3. If bankruptcy is regarded as being within the traditional equitable jurisdiction, it un-
doubtedly has become the most regimented and codified part of equity, demonstrating a situation 
where the contemporary complexity of commercial enterprises has simply outstripped the old law. 
It should be noted, however, that while bankruptcy sounds in equity, Bank of Marin v. England, 
385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966), it originated from statutory, not chancery, antecedents. 1 H. REMINGTON, 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 3, 31 (1908). 
4. For example, the case ofTulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1849), is still often cited as 
the basis of modem holdings in the field of equitable servitudes. E.g., Hunt v. Del Collo, 317 A.2d 
545,549 (Del. 1974); Silver Blue Lake Apartments Inc. v. Silver Blue Lake Homeowners Assoc., 
245 So. 2d 609, 611 (Fla. 1971); Steuart Transp. v. Ashe, 269 Md. 74, 91, 304 A.2d 788,798 (1973). 
The case of Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852), in which equity did not force an opera 
singer to sing, and the related case of Lumley v. Oye, 118 Eng. Rep. 748 (1853), are frequently 
cited in specific performance cases. See, e.g., Sugerman v. Jim Dandy Co., 286 Ala. 295, 304, 239 
So. 2d 545, 553 (1970); Lemat Corp. v. Barry 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 678, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 
(1969); Northern Del. Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Bliss, 245 A.2d 431, 434 (Del. 1968). 
5. The term "common law cases" is used in this Article as a shorthand form to mean litiga-
tion based on common law rather than statutory causes of action, although equitable remedies as 
well as damages are sought. 
526 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:524 
thority to exercise equitable powers so as to permit violations of stat-
utes to continue. 
Part II explores the traditional forms of equitable discretion as 
they exist in the classic common law context. Properly viewed in this 
context, equity has three distinct and separable balancing components: 
a threshold balance, a balance on the question of abatement or re-
quired conduct, and finally a balance in tailoring equitable remedies to 
effectuate the second determination. 
In Part III, the Article demonstrates how separating equitable bal-
ancing into its three components permits conventional notions about 
the scope of equitable discretion to be reconciled with modem statutory 
imperatives. Viewed in light of the three separate elements of equitable 
balancing, the holdings in statutory cases reveal a consistent pattern. 
Courts defer to the legislature's statutory commands and proscrip-
tions-the second stage of equitable balancing. On the other hand, 
they generally retain discretion in making the threshold determinations 
and in tailoring remedies, and statutes only rarely take over these two 
equitable functions. Over the years, however, the courts have demon-
strated confusion and vagueness in their discussions of equity and stat-
utory violations, particularly regarding Hecht Co. v. Bow/es,6 the 
leading case. Part III presents a clarifying analysis of the cases. 
Finally, Part IV analyzes the consequences of equitable deference 
to statutory mandates. Judicial enforcement of statutory provisions, 
even where violations appear to be mere technicalities, in effect trans-
fers each controversy to the legislative forum. Such remands to the 
legislature comport with modem theories of pluralism and par-
ticipatory democracy. The process also reinforces the constitutional 
separation of powers doctrine as it exists in the modem state. 
I 
A MODERN EQUITY PROPOSITION 
The problems of traditional equitable discretion in the modem 
context are most dramatically presented by the difficult but illuminat-
ing case of a defendant found violating a specific statutory term, espe-
cially where the trial judge considers the violation trivial or a mere 
anachronism. The judge may also be convinced that the defendant is 
committing the violation while engaged in an enterprise of overriding 
public importance. If the same defendant were involved in purely non-
statutory litigation, the court could simply weigh the public importance 
of the defendant's activity against the plaintiffs interest. As a result of 
this classic balancing of the equities, the court could permit the defend-
6. 321 U.S. 321 (1944), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 73-112. 
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ant's otherwise tortious or illegal conduct to continue.7 But what hap-
pens in the statutory context? A review of old and new equity cases 
and a consideration of the tripartite nature of the modern state leads to 
a contrary proposition: H'ilen a court in equity is cO'!fronted on the merits 
with a continuing violation of statutory law, it has no discretion or author-
ity to balance the equities so as to permit that violation to continue. 8 
This conclusion may upset generally accepted notions of equity 
jurisdiction, however outdated or unrealistic they may be. Yet this 
proposition is far less disturbing than the contrary assertion that courts, 
balancing equities, have the power to permit particular defendants to 
continue to violate statutes with impunity. This alternative would con-
stitute a remarkably direct extension of the judicial function into the 
process of amending legislation. . 
When the classic doctrines of equitable discretion confront the re-
ality of clear statutory violations, the time-honored dogma of balancing 
cannot survive without some sympathetic analytical retooling. Far 
from stripping the courts of their traditional powers of equitable discre-
tion, however,9 the analysis advanced here draws distinctions that pre-
serve a discretionary role for equity courts even where statutes are 
involved. As Part II will demonstrate, close analysis reveals that the 
traditional balance of equities actually subsumes three separate bal-
7. This occurs in cases where common law liability for damages is found but no abatement 
is required. See infra notes 43-62 and accompanying text.· The traditional balancing of the equi-
ties, of course, verified the respective interests of and consequences to the public as well as those of 
the private parties before the tribunal. See McClintock, Discretion to Deny Injunction Against 
Trespass and Nuisance, 12 MINN. L. REV. 565 (1928). 
8. Throughout this analysis it is assumed that the court has determined through a process 
of statutory construction and application of statutes to particular facts that a statutory violation 
exists. The Article does not purport to analyze the process of statutory interpretation, a pathway 
of craft and mystery that has been well scouted by others. E.g., H. HART, JR. & A. SACKS, THE 
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND ApPLICATION OF LAW ch. VII (1958). It 
is sufficient to note that the process offers courts numerous opportunities to define, shift, and recast 
the language of statutes as they apply in particular cases. In addressing those situations where 
discrete violations have been defined and found to exist on particular facts, this Article presumes 
that courts have successfully resisted the temptation to use the statutory interpretation process 
disingenuously by defining a statutory violation out of existence so as to avoid potential con-
straints on their equitable discretion. 
Not all, nor even most, statutes provide such specific prohibitions as to require such equitable 
deference. Many statutes build in flexibility through the delegation of rulemaking and adjudica-
tory power to administrative agencies. Many statutes do, however, impose direct mandates. Even 
where such mandates do not exist, the present analysis forms the basic relationship between courts 
and legislatures. 
9. Reaction against the proposition of mandatory compliance has been couched, for in-
stance, in assertions that the proposition "Strip[s) The Court Of Its Inherent Equitable Power To 
Determine Whether Or Not It Is In The Public Interest To Grant Equitable Relief." Brief for 
Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae at 5, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
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ances, IO only one of which is necessarily preempted by statutory defini-
tions of prohibited conductY 
To say that courts cannot permit statutory violations to continue is 
not to say that injunctions must issue for all statutory violations. It is 
perfectly possible, and often desirable, for the courts to assure that stat-
utory compliance occur without issuing an injunction, so long as it is 
clear that compliance will in fact occur.12 Where the judge believes 
that a statute does not serve the public interest in a particular case, he 
or she is of course free to say so, but must nevertheless give the law its 
required effect. In such cases the practical result of statutory enforce-
ment, by injunction or otherwise, will often be a transfer of the contro-
versy to the legislature, which is the proper repository of the power to 
promulgate statutory exemptions and amendments. 13 
The restriction of statutory balancing to the legislature will, no 
doubt, be disturbing to many who share our profession's longstanding 
suspicion of absolutist principles that cannot be compromised and bal-
anced by a court. The initial instinctive reaction of most attorneys and 
jurists is to assume that when Congress authorized injunctive relief for 
statutory violations, it must have intended to incorporate the full dis-
10. A threshold balance, an abatement balance, and the tailoring of effectuating remedies, as 
analyzed infra in text accompanying notes 36-68. 
II. A statute which proscribes particular conduct takes over the job previously held by the 
courts of determining which conduct must be abated and which may continue. See infra text 
accompanying notes 193-276. 
12. This proposition underlies Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 326-31 (1944), discussed 
infra in text accompanying notes 73-112. It also underlies two recent majority opinions by Chief 
Justice Burger: TVA v. Hill, 427 U.S. 153 (1978), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 114-
18,298-304, and Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49 (1975), discussed infra in text accom-
panying notes 169-73. 
13. This remand to the legislature-a judicial phenomenon which arises in the context of 
participatory democracy and public interest litigation, and elsewhere-was first described by Jo-
seph Sax in the context of citizen efforts to bring public trust issues to legislative attention. See J. 
SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 175-92 (1971). Judicial deference to statutory commands 
accordingly serves the continuing trend toward pluralistic participation in American government. 
This process of internal democratization-first chronicled in Stewart, The Reformation oj' Ameri-
can Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667 (I 975)--is traceable in a variety of administrative 
law cases and statutes in the years since the mid-1960's. See, e.g., National Welfare Rights Org. v. 
Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. 
FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (facilitating citizen intervention in agency proceedings); 
Scenic Hudson Preservation Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), urt. 
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967) 
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976»; Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 
1241 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976». To some extent it is possible to discern a re-
trenchment against pluralistic democracy in recent cases limiting citizen participation. See, e.g., 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 
(1978) (holding that the procedural minimums required of agency rulemaking in the 1946 Admin-
istrative Procedure Act were actually also procedural maximums where citizen rights were con-
cerned); see a/so cases cited infra note 17. 
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cretion of equity as well. Courts must always be able to compromise 
statutory violations; they do so all the time. 
Beyond the constitutional implications of the contention that 
courts have the power to override statutes,14 one response to reactions 
against limitations of equitable discretion is to point to the remarkable 
absence over the years of equity cases permitting statutory violations to 
continue. It is difficult, if not impossible, to find cases in which courts 
have permitted proved statutory violations to continue unabated. 
There have, of course, been literally hundreds of statutory violation 
cases in which injunctions have not been issued. Those cases, however, 
all fit into one or another category that is consistent with the present 
proposition. 
By far the largest category of statutory violation cases where in-
junctions have been denied involves past violations where the courts 
find that statutory compliance will henceforth be achieved without in-
junctive relief. IS A second category involves preliminary proceedings 
seeking temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions. Be-
cause such proceedings occur prior to a full hearing on the merits, it is 
understandable that these cases do not always result in enforcement 
orders against putative violators. 16 In another class of cases, estoppel or 
other threshold questions may preclude statutory enforcement, espe-
cially with regard to criminal statutes. 17 In these cases the courts bar 
the question of the need for injunctive relief from being heard, so here 
14. See infra notes 305·19 and accompanying text. 
15. See, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944). In the following representative cases, 
no injunction issued since compliance had been achieved and there was no likelihood of future 
violations of the subject statute: Wallace v. Cutten, 298 U.S. 229 (1936); Mitchell v. Bland, 241 
F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1957); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 479 F. Supp. 536 
(D.N.M. 1979); SEC v. Cenco, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Goldberg v. Martin, 198 F. 
Supp. 836 (S.D. Miss. 1961); Mitchell v. Kickapoo Prairie Broadcasting Co., 182 F. Supp. 578 
(W.O. Mo. 1960), modified, 288 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1961); Henderson v. J.B. Beaird Corp., 48 F. 
Supp. 252 (W.O. La. 1943). 
16. The traditional standards for issuance of a preliminary injunction typically include con· 
sideration of plaintiff's likelihood of prevailing on the merits, the possibility of irreparable harm to 
plaintiff, the counterbalancing risk of harm to defendant, and the requirements of the public inter· 
est. See, e.g., Martinez v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1233, 1242·43 (5th Cir. 1976); Developments in tlte 
Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994, 1059 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. The 
extent to which these elements are determined or affected by an alleged statutory violation has not 
been much commented on, but it would appear that all four elements would be affected by statu· 
tory considerations so as to require enforcement in direct proportion to the clarity of the alleged 
violation. The force of the general equitable proposition analyzed here, in other words, would 
seem to apply in the preliminary relief context as well. 
17. Cf. United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973) (trial court 
erred in refusing to admit evidence that might establish that the government had affirmatively 
misled the defendant so that the defendant believed that its actions did not violate the Rivers and 
Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976». Prosecutorial discretion also operates to avoid presenting 
violations to the courts for decision. Where a violated provision of a statute is not directly en· 
forceable by citizen suits, the decision of agencies or public prosecutors not to prosecute provides a 
-- -----
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too they never reach the merits of the alleged violations. 18 Nor do 
cases in which federal courts decline to issue injunctions when state 
proceedings are underway or available contradict the proposition,19 for 
again the courts never reach the merits of the claimed violations. 
Other major categories where injunctions have been refused in-
clude cases of procedural violations where substantial compliance has 
occurred prior to the resolution of the suit;20 cases where the courts 
have simply concluded that the defendant's actions do not violate the 
statute at issue;21 and cases in which a statute gives a court discretion to 
permit continued noncompliance,22 vests the court with authority to de-
termine what constitutes a violation in particular circumstances,23 or 
provides for exemptions.24 There is also a category of cases in which it 
is not perfectly clear what the district court actually held with regard to 
a particular statutory violation.25 And in cases where the alleged viola-
major screening function, leaving citizens to their common law remedies. See California v. Sierra 
Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775 (1981). 
18. Such threshold questions, which may effectively nonsuit the plaintiff, involve judicial 
discretion; the courts accordingly retain the power to ignore clear estoppel situations and grant 
relief. See generally cases cited infra note 157. 
19. Cj. Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976) (restricting power of federal 
courts to stay state court proceedings); Younger v. Harris, 410 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (interests of 
"comity" and "Our Federalism" require that federal courts not enjoin pending state proceedings). 
Seealso Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (abstention by federal district court appropri-
ate when plaintiff has appropriate state means for vindicating federal constitutional claims). 
20. E.g., Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Essex County Pres-
ervation Ass'n v. Campbell, 536 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1976). 
21. Thus, numerous courts held that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 
U.S.c. §§ 4321-4369 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), would not be applied where, even though a federal 
project did not have a statutorily required impact statement, it was too close to completion for 
NEP A's procedural requirements to be applied in a manner that would usefully achieve the statu-
tory purposes. This resembles either an estoppel defense or a statutory interpretation implying a 
sort of retroactive grandfather clause. See infra note 238. Similarly, where a defendant's violation 
of a statute is de minimis, the courts are likely to find that no violation has occurred. See, e.g., 
United States v. General Foods Corp., 446 F. Supp. 740, 754 n.16 (N.D.N.Y. 1978). 
22. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, ch. 758, § 2(d)(7), 62 Stat. 1155, 1157 
(current version at 33 U.S.c. § 1251 (1976», for example, contained a total transfer of the abate-
ment question to the courts. See infra text accompanying notes 223-24. 
23. See Labor Management Relations Act § 206, 61 Stat. 152, 155 (current version at 29 
U.S.c. § 178 (1976» (giving court power to enjoin labor strike upon finding that a strike's continu-
ation will "imperil the national health or safety"), discussed infra in text accompanying note 199. 
24. The River and Harbors Act of 1899 prohibits the obstruction of navigable waters, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 403, 407, 409 (1976), but exempts log driving on rivers. Id. § 410, conslrued in United 
States v. Kennebec Log Driving Co., 491 F.2d 562, 566 (1st Cir. 1973). 
25.· In Schultz v. Hartsock, 63 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 32,344 (M.D. Fla. 1970), for example, the 
court refused to issue an injunction requiring adequate recordkeeping as mandated by § 15 of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.c. §§ 201-214 (1976). It is not clear that the sawmill's 
labor violation was not being corrected in good faith, although the judge certainly also seemed to 
weigh the equity of the government's lack of prior "diligent effort to assist defendant in complying 
with the technical provision of the ... Act" in denying an injunction. 63 Lab. Cas. (CCH) at 
~ 32,345. See also Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd with clar(jicalion oflhe 
findings of/acI and law, 549 F.2d 1064, 1069-70 (6th Cir. 1977), ajJ'd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The 
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tion is based on a constitutional rather than a statutory mandate, courts 
paradoxically possess more discretionary authority to permit delayed 
or lessened compliance, for example "with all deliberate speed."26 
Finally, it is both logical and consistent with the proposition of 
judicial deference to statutes to recognize that equity courts can refuse 
to issue injunctions where compliance is impossible. Like King Ca-
nute, equity courts would accomplish nothing (beyond humbling them-
selves and diminishing popular respect for their powers )27 if they 
attempted to order the ocean to hold back its waves or rivers to run 
uphill.28 Futility is properly a limitation of equitable discretion, since 
most difficult case to analyze in terms consistent with the proposition is Reserve Mining Co. v. 
EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 220-33. In Reserve 
Mining the court allowed a delayed injunctive compliance schedule, using reasoning that seemed 
to turn more on a common law "hazard" standard than on any specific statutory violation. 
26. Where the Court determines that a statute or practice is unconstitutional, it often pro-
vides a cushion in the enforcement of the new interpretation. For example, where retroactive 
application of a new constitutional standard of criminal procedure would disrupt the administra-
tion of justice and where there has been official reliance on past standards, the Court may decide 
to apply it only prospectively. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (limiting the 
retroactive application of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961». Where, however, basic procedural 
rights are involved, the Court may choose to apply the new rule retroactively despite consequent 
disruptions, as in the aftermath of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The school deseg-
regation cases required compliance "with all deliberate speed." Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 
U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II). In both types of constitutional cases it can be argued that the 
new definitions of constitutional principles are judge-made law, interpreting broad old language 
in the light of evolving modern realities; hence, courts are in a position to tailor their application. 
Further, general constitutional principles derive their specificity from the interpretations of courts, 
whereas statutory violations derive from more specific legislative declarations. Accordingly, there 
are fewer problems in the nature of lack of notice and estoppel in the statutory than the constitu-
tional context. Even in the constitutional arena the judicial cushion may be problematic. Justice 
Black once said that the deliberate speed formula "delayed the process of outlawing segregation" 
and that it would have been preferable to treat Brown "as an ordinary lawsuit and force that 
judgment on the counties it affected that minute." Justice Black and the Bill of Rights, CBS News 
Special, Dec. 3, 1968, quoted in W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
1275 (5th ed. 1980). See also R. WOODWARD & C. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 38-40 (1979) 
(describing Justice Black's concern over the South's slow implementation of Brown). 
27. A judicial apprehension that a decree would be ignored, thereby bringing disrespect to 
the courts, may sometime underlie decisions not to issue injunctive relief. By the nature of the 
problem, however, courts would understandably be reluctant to articulate such grounds for re-
straint; at any rate, no such avowals have been found. King Canute, it should be noted, did not 
reap disrespect for his feckless royal command that the waves be stilled; he had staged the sea-
shore scene as a wry demonstration of his own mortality to silence the flattering sycophants 
amongst his courtiers. W. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 140 
(1956). 
28. See TVA v. Tennessee Elec. Power Co., 90 F.2d 885, 894-95 (6th Cir. 1937) (''The court 
may not command the waters of the Tennessee River and its tributaries to cease their flow.") See 
also infra notes 261-73 and accompanying text. In National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, Civ. No. 
79-0915, slip op. (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 1982), the district court found that federal dams violate the 
Clean Water Act of 1977,33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), if they discharge their 
water without a statutory permit. The court ordered the government to obtain such permits. If 
the court had gone on to issue an injunction ordering permitless dams to close their gates and the 
water discharges to halt, its order would have been overflowed in fact even before it had a chance 
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equity will not command the doing of a vain thing.29 
In sum, these assorted variations on a theme demonstrate a variety 
of adjustments to a basic principle, not the undercutting of the essential 
proposition that equity must defer to statutory commands. The case 
law reflects a remarkable, though unheralded, consistency over the past 
fifty years: cases hold that statutes dispositively define the nature of 
prohibited and permitted conduct, thereby ·removing one entire area of 
discretion from the courts. 
Recognition of an equitable power to override statutes would rep-
resent a significant expansion of judicial authority beyond its existing 
limits; it would also require extremely sensitive definitions of limits and 
standards to the open-ended discretion thereby unleashed.30 But there 
to be overturned on appeal. This Canute principle appears to be sufficiently self-evident that no 
court has bothered to state the obvious. An injunction is a functional order rather than a symbolic 
philosophical act. Since equity is attempting to see that something be done, or not be done-
rather than issuing pronunciamentos against discerned evils---it would be both useless and unnec-
essary for a court to command a physical impossibility. For other cases of impossibility, see 
Moffett v. City of Rock Island, 77 Ill. App. 3d 850, 854, 397 N.E.2d 457,460 (1969) (state takeover 
of a major highway project prevented city from building a platted road that had been promised to 
adjacent landowner, i.e. a case of legal impossibility); Davenport v. Bankers Life Co., 178 Neb. 
591, 134 N.W.2d 258,261 (1965) (insured party, being dead, could no longer be ordered to endorse 
documents necessary for payment to changed beneficiary). Courts also have used the impossibil-
ity principle in other nonstatutory cases where compliance with legal duties would be relatively 
impossible, in the sense of being unreasonably onerous in light of the benefit conferred. Martin v. 
New York Life Ins. Co., 104 F.2d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 1939); Mutual Savings Life Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 
188 F. Supp. 148, 154 (E.D. Tenn. 1960); Butler v. Butler, 239 A.2d 616, 619 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968). 
29. Watterson v. Ury, 5 Ohio C.C. 347, 360 (Cir. Ct. 1891), ajJ'd, 52 Ohio St. 637, 44 N.E. 
1149 (1894), states the principle that equity will not decree a vain act in a different context, where 
compliance with the subject trust obligations was impossible because land could no longer be 
practically used for trust purposes (with no discussion of cy pres principles). The principle that 
equity will not require the doing of an impossibility is a recurrent maxim. See supra note 28. See 
also Rust v. Conrad, 47 Mich. 449, 455, 11 N.W. 265, 267 (1882) (Cooley, J.). 
30. This is the problem posed by arguments presented by the U.S. Navy in Weinberger v. 
Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct. 88 (1981), granting cert. to Brown v. Romero-Barcelo, 643 F.2d 835 
(1st Cir. 1981), discussed ilifra in text accompanying notes 243-63. See also ilifra text accompany-
ing notes 116-18 (discussing Justice Rehnquist's analysis of a district court's power to override 
statutory provisions). 
A striking recent example of the problematic assertion that courts may override statutes is 
presented in Professor Calabresi's absorbing new book, G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE 
AGE OF STATUTES (1982). Professor Calabresi responds to the "statutorization" of our legal sys-
tem, which derives from this century's "orgy of statute making," by suggesting that courts be 
allowed to nullify those statutes (new or old) that the judges find to be "anachronistic." Going 
beyond the customary judicial rules for desuetude, he defines legal obsolescence as a "lack of fit" 
or "lack of current legislative support." Although this may oversimplify Calabresi's argument, he 
is clearly treading on dangerous ground. There are those who would be delighted to argue in 
court that many of our civil rights statutes, for example, do not fit modem circumstances in North 
or South, and that the complexion of Congress has assuredly changed since they were passed. 
Surely a district court should not be able to step in and relieve desegregation's opponents of the 
burden of amending these civil rights statutes in the more familiar constitutional manner. Cala-
bresi's argument does not adequately integrate the nature of the modem American lawmaking 
process: statutes are spawned in political maelstroms; they often are never again so supported on 
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is no apparent need to let that judicial genie out of the bottle. Analysis 
of equitable theory indicates that such an extension of equitable discre-
tion is as unnecessary as it would be conceptually difficult. 
II 
ANALYZING EQUITABLE DISCRETION 
A. Historical Origins 
It should not be very controversial to discern a principle in Ameri-
can jurisprudence that courts cannot permit a statutory violation, once 
proven, to continue unrestrained. Discretion, however, has always lain 
at the heart of equity jurisdiction, and courts have always had the right 
and duty to "balance the equities" when requested to issue injunc-
tions.31 The present analysis circumscribes the traditional definitions 
of equitable discretion in a manner that may seem extreme. It would 
hold that a court has no discretion to allow statutorily proscribed con-
duct to continue. Where a defendant is intransigent, an injunction 
abating the defendant's conduct must issue. 
The consternation this proposition engenders may be a tribute to 
the cloudiness with which the subtleties and character of equitable ju-
risprudence are understood. Equity springs from ancient sources, and 
in many regards retains the principles of its past. It is also, however, a 
component part of our vastly evolved modem legal system. It should 
not be surprising that equity has developed applications and nuances 
that add to and differ from those of past centuries, nor that modem 
statutes have made a major difference. 
Traditional notions of equitable discretion have their origins in the 
earliest roots of equity. Aristotle's concept of equity was first and fore-
most the power of the tribunal to override specific rules where particu-
lar circumstances seemed to require such dispensation. "What 
the floor of the legislature as the day they pass, yet they continue to provide the accepted matrix 
for future legislative battles over amendments and new legislation, not to mention for subsequent 
statutory interpretation by the courts. To permit judges to intrude their own judgments of "fit" 
and "legislative support" raises far more definitional, procedural, and philosophical problems 
than answers. 
31. There is one theme that runs throughout injunctive litigation and often gives it ro-
mance. That is discretion. The cases abound with quaint statements, such as that an 
application for an injunction is an appeal to the Chancellor's conscience; that the injunc-
tion is a discretionary remedy or that a court of equity has the inherent power to create 
and fashion a flexible remedy. 
O. FISS, supra note 2, at 74. That flexibility, Fiss notes, led to Selden's "well-known crack" that 
equity varies like the Chancellor's foot. Id In Truly v. Wanzer, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 141, 142 (1847), 
the Court observed: 
There is no power, the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, 
deliberation, and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issu-
ing of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity, that never ought to be extended, 
unless to cases of great injury . . . . 
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Aristotle had in mind when he analyzed the concept of 'equity' and its 
relationship to justice was simply the 'rectification of law where it fails 
through generality.' "32 Equity as translated into the jurisprudence of 
the English chancellors was likewise an appeal to the conscience of the 
tribunal, an articulation of principles of fairness or morality that were 
specifically designed to exempt defendants from compliance with the 
harshness of rigid legal rules.33 
Equity grew far beyond its dispensation function, of course, devel-
oping the special remedies that today are its most visible attribute. 
Still, however, equity was dedicated to the implementation of an over-
arching law of morally-tinged fairness and ethics to be applied when 
legal rules fell short. The injunctive order, issued by the church-based 
equity courts, was an extraordinary remedy. It was reserved, at least in 
theory, for those cases where courts operating under rules of law would 
not adequately protect plaintiffs from being unfairly had by defend-
ants. At that point, equity would step in and go beyond the law. 
A special perspective of balance and relativity has characterized 
the development of equity law. In Aristotelian terms it was a balance 
between the citizen violating a particular rule and the more general 
societal context in which other facts or norms might excuse the viola-
tion. Principles of relativity also governed application of the injunction 
as it developed over the years. If plaintiffs could prove a cause of ac-
tion at common law, yet felt that the common law would inadequately 
redress their injuries, an appeal to equity was still available.34 But 
before the injunction would be issued, plaintiffs, in response to affirma-
tive defenses, had to satisfy tests of relativity between themselves and 
defendants that were not required at law: a reasonable alacrity in su-
ing, relatively clean hands, a favorable balance of convenience, and the 
like. Out of these principles of relativity came the touchstone phrase 
"balancing the equities" that has so characterized and beclouded de-
bates over equity both in the past and present. 
32. o. FISS, supra note 2, at 75. 
33. See T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 685 (5th ed. 1956); 
Vinogradoff, Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth Century Jurisprudence, 24 LAW Q. REV. 373 
(1908). The very term "equity" was not generally used until the 17th century. O. FISS, supra note 
2, at 10-13; I J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 5-9 (5th ed. 1941). 
34. Equitable remedies originally were regularly available in situations where there was no 
"legal," or common law, cause of action. This effectively combined equitable findings of liability 
and abatement. Today it is rare to find such a free floating equitable cause of action beyond such 
equity fields as trusts, probate, and liens, which, of course, have been codified. One of the rare 
modem examples of an injunction issued without a basic cause of action in the field of property 
litigation is the unreported Florissant Fossil Beds case. Defenders of Florissant, Inc. v. Park Land 
Co., No. 403-69 (10th Cir. July 29, 1969), discussed in V. Y ANNACONE, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 
AND REMEDIES § 2.9, at 39 (1972). Seealso Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971) 
(injunction against logging in potential wilderness area issued without statutory violation), cert. 
denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972). 
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A vast array of discretionary equitable concepts has been included 
over the years in the concept of balancing the equities: laches, estoppel, 
balance of hardships, clean hands, balancing of comparative utilities, 
consideration of the public interest, weighing the adequacy of legal 
remedies, irreparability, the balance of convenience, and the tailoring 
of remedies. All of these principles require equitable relativity and dis-
cretion in their application-a comparison of the circumstances of 
plaintiffs, defendants, and frequently of society at large. 
Often, however, the term "balance of equities" is used to denote 
only a balancing of private and public interests, thereby obscuring all 
the other balances of the parties' relativity. The inconsistency and 
vagueness with which the term is sometimes used argue for acknowl-
edgment of the term's all-inclusive scope or its rejection in favor of the 
more straightforward concept of discretion. The imprecision of termi-
nology is of more than academic concern. When courts and commen-
tators fail to specify what particular aspects of the elements available 
for balancing they are including within the comprehensive term "bal-
ancing the equities," they set the stage for significant misunderstanding 
and conflict: any constraint on a single element of the equitable bal-
ance appears to endanger the heart of the equity jurisdiction. And any 
rule that seems to infringe on a court's freedom to "balance the equi-
ties" is seen as a threat to a time-honored system which "eschews 
mechanical rules ... [and] depends on flexibility."3s 
B. Equitable Discretion in the Common Law: Dissecting the Concept 
of "Balancing the Equities" 
Equity's relationship to the common law over the centuries pro-
vides the analytical filter through which most commentators describe 
and dissect equitable jurisdiction. Understandably, then, the common 
law colors the analysis of equity when statutes are involved. In fact, the 
present analysis of judicial discretion limited by statute fits comfortably 
into the traditional law of equity. It is based upon distinctions found in 
the old law itself. 
When equity's application in traditional common law cases is sub-
jected to careful analysis, some basic clarifications emerge. Analyti-
cally it can be argued that the umbrella terms "balancing the equities" 
35. Holmberg v. Annbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946). The existence of broad based discre-
tion, of course, does not mean that equity does not have its own rules. Its rules and canons are 
many and often contradictory. I am indebted to the useful discussion of early equity that appears 
in Winner, The Chancellor's Foot and Environmental Low: A Call for Beller Reasoned Decisions on 
Environmental Injunctions, 9 ENVTL. L. 477, 479-85 (1979). Winner, however, asserts a very differ-
ent view than that presented here of judicial discretion in the face of statutory violations, largely 
based on his reading of NEPA cases. Id at 506-10, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 
235-42. 
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and "equitable discretion" obscure what are really three separate areas 
of balancing, three different functions fulfilled by three different types 
of equitable relativism. The three areas are: 
1. Threshold Balancing, based in both law and equity, which tests 
whether plaintiffs can maintain their actions. This stage includes 
questions of laches, clean hands, other estoppels, the lack of an ad-
equate remedy at law, proof of irreparable harm, and similar 
issues. 
2. The Determination of Contending Conducts ascertains which con-
duct will be permitted to continue and which will be subordinated. 
It often involves the question of abatement, a separate issue from 
the question of liability for past injuries to protected interests. 
3. Discretion in Fashioning Remedies involves a process of tailoring 
remedies to implement the second stage determination of contend-
ing conducts. 
Consider, for example, the relatively simple field of private nui-
sance torts where equity has traditionally played an active role. The 
classic Ducktown Copper36 case demonstrates all three of equity's dis-
tinctly different roles. In that turn-of-the-century case, the court had to 
deal with an early example of an environmental tradeoff. The smelting 
industry was getting underway in the foothills of southeastern Tennes-
see and northern Georgia. It was likely to provide sizable revenues for 
the entrepreneurs of Atlanta and Chattanooga, jobs for local residents, 
and copper and other materials for the nation's industrial economy. 
The copper ore was mined in nearby hills, then smelted in large open-
air piles layered with firewood and coal. This firing process, however, 
produced acidic "sulphurectic" air emissions that eventually turned 
nearly a hundred square miles of hills into a remarkably stark, de-
nuded desert, its topsoil slowing washing away down sterile, chemical-
laden streams.37 The plaintiffs were farmers whose fields and orchards 
began to die as the smelting got underway. 
The Tennessee high court held that the smelting was a continuing 
private nuisance, but after long and careful deliberation allowed the 
defendant industries to continue operations despite their drastic impact 
upon the plaintiffs' land and livelihood. The court required only that 
the mills compensate the plaintiffs for their losses.38 In common par-
36. Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904). 
37. Much of the land has been reclaimed over the past two decades, although about 20 
square miles are still marked on the Tennessee State Planning Office's cadastral survey land use 
map as "barren lands." Tennessee State Planning Office Map: Tennessee Land Use (1973). 
38. 113 Tenn. at 367-68, 83 S.W. at 667. This result could be explained merely as a finding 
that plaintiffs' injuries were adequately remedied at law, but the traditional uniqueness of land, 
see DeFuniak, Contracts Enforceable in eqUity, 34 VA. L. REv. 637, 643 (1948), and the court's 
extended discussion of a balancing of the importance of the parties' respective conduct indicate 
otherwise. 
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lance, it awarded legal compensatory damages but denied any injunc-
tive remedy, based on a balancing of equities. 
The Ducktown court certainly balanc~d the equities. Analytically, 
however, it did so not once but thrice. 
1. Threshold Balancing 
The first type of balancing addresses threshold questions which 
plaintiffs must survive if a cause of action is to be heard. Some issues 
appear in the guise of affirmative legal defenses: laches and coming to 
the nuisance, for example, are legal defenses grounded in principles of 
equitable estoppel. Other issues-clean hands, additional estoppel 
principles, proof of irreparable harm, and the inadequacy of legal rem-
edies-are more specifically equitable, brought to bear only where the 
plaintiff seeks equitable remedies.39 Each of these threshold issues in-
volves comparisons and balances that are part of the longstanding dis-
cretionary processes of equity. The Ducktown court made several such 
determinations, excluding some plaintiffs on laches grounds as to cer-
tain defendants,40 confirming their rights to sue as to others,41 and not-
ing injuries to land42 that analytically made equitable remedies 
potentially available on grounds of irreparability. 
2. The Determination of Contending Conducts 
After plaintiffs survive equity'S threshold gauntlet, nonstatutory 
litigation moves to the application of rules of conduct. The major dis-
cretionary function of the equity court of this second stage is the deter-
mination of whether the defendant's conduct will be permitted to 
continue. To reach this abatement determination, however, courts 
must first consider issues of liability. 
39. That these elements involve classic equity balances is hard to doubt. The laches defense 
is available, for example, when "such changes have taken place in the position of the parties 
relative to the subject matter of the litigation as to render it inequitable to permit the enforcement 
of rights." Norman v. Boyer, III Colo. 531, 535,143 P.2d 1017, 1018 (1943) (quoting DuBois v. 
Clark, 12 Colo. App. 220, 231, 55 P. 750, 754 (1898». The relativity of the clean hands doctrine is 
demonstrated in Leo Feist v. Young, 138 F.2d 972,975 (7th Cir. 1943), where a copyright infringer 
defended on the ground that the holder of the copyright had violated a Wisconsin statute. The 
court declared: "But the rule is not inexorable that a plaintiff who comes into court with unclean 
hands is always to be denied relief regardless of other circumstances in the case; for if the defend-
ant has been guilty of conduct more unconscionable and unworthy than that of the plaintiff, the 
rule may be relaxed." Id (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95 
F.2d 978, 983, amended per curiam, 95 F.2d at 985 (6th Cir. 1937». 
40. 113 Tenn. at 355-56, 83 S.W. at 664. 
41. Id at 356-57, 83 S.W. at 664. 
42. Id at 358-63, 83 S.W. at 664-66. See supra note 38. 
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a. Liability 
The initial question is whether defendants are liable at all, whether 
their conduct is "illegal" under the common law. In this question 
equity may playa part, though not a cardinal role. The basic common 
law definition of liability for past conduct may itself be infiltrated by 
equitable balancing in those jurisdictions that retain some notion of 
comparative utilities as an element of the substantive tort,43 and not 
just as part of the remedy question. 
There has been a longrunning incestuous relationship between law 
and equity. Equity, it is true, has generally kept a separate identity as 
to the availability and issuance of remedies-a heritage traceable to the 
dispensations of Greek philosophy, the fairness principles of canon 
law, and the flexibility of orders in chancery.44 This separate identity 
has continued despite the merger of law and equity in England in 
187345 and in the United States in the 1930's.46 As early as the 1600's, 
however, an interchange of substantive principles between law and 
equity began.47 Some equitable defenses became legal defenses by 
osmosis. 
In the field of nuisance law, equity invaded the common law by 
introducing a comparative weighing of public values in trespass ac-
tions .. Instead of merely viewing a case as a contest between an injured 
plaintiff and a causative defendant, an equitable balance came to be 
incorporated in the cause of action. Thus, in a famous early English air 
pollution tort case, the injury caused to plaintiff's nose and habitation 
by a nearby candlemaker's malodorous establishment was ignored by 
the court of law, which found no tort to exist because "Ie utilitie del 
43. Under earlier precedents, interestingly enough, the law and equity questions were mixed 
in another fashion: an injunction would al,ltomatically issue whenever a nuisance was found. See 
Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 345, 354-56, 100 S.E. 207, 212 (1919); Note, 
Efficient Land Use and the Internalization of Benificial Spillovers: An Economic and Legal Analy-
sis, 31 STAN. L. REV. 457, 464 (1979). This too produced draconian results. In the paradigm case 
of Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. I, 101 N.E. 805 (1913), a farmer suffering yearly 
losses of $312 won a nuisance injunction against a $1 million pulp plant for polluting a Hudson 
Valley creek. Though that plant actually was shut down, see Driscoll v. American Hide & 
Leather Co., 102 Misc. 612, 614,170 N.Y.S. 121, 122, affd, 184 A.D. 916, 170 N.Y.S. 1076 (1918), 
one suspects that successful litigants more often used their injunctions to strike attractive bargains. 
Where such drastic results were possible, however, it may well be that courts often simply declined 
to find nuisance liability at all, effectively duplicating the results of the utility based definitions of 
initial liability. 
44. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35. 
45. See English Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., ch. 66, §§ 24-25. 
46. In the United States the culmination of the merger of law and equity was marked by the 
enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 
1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976» (Rules Enabling Act). 
47. See 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 299 (1927). 
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chose excusera Ie noisomeness del stink.,"48 a quintessentially equitable 
distinction. 
When courts of law allowed proof of preponderant public utility to 
nullify a nuisance cause of action, plaintiffs were effectively nonsuited 
from even a legal remedy because of an essentially equitable balancing. 
Similarly, the tort definitions of substantial injury and unreasonable 
action also have turned to some extent on a balancing that resembles 
an equitable rather than a legal standard.49 Thus, in some common 
law actions equitable balancing negated liability where it would other-
wise lie.50 No matter how substantial plaintiffs injuries, if the public 
benefits of defendant's operation were greater, there would be no 
liability. 
This draconian approach is being replaced by theories that sepa-
rate the questions of liability and consequent damages from those of 
abatement in intentional tort.51 Under this approach, if a suit seeks 
compensatory damages alone, no further equity issues arise beyond the 
threshold stage.52 More typically, however, plaintiffs in private nui-
sance cases and in other common law areas seek equitable remedies-
particularly injunctions-as well as damages. In such cases, once tort 
liability is found, the court turns to the different question of whether 
defendant's conduct will be abated. 
48. J. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 106 (1890). The 
quotation appears to be a version of the bastardized Norman French of Ranketts Case (K.B. 
1606), reported in 2 H. ROLLE, ROLLE'S ABRIDGEMENT 139 (1668): "Si home fait Candells deins 
un Vill, per que il cause un noysom Sent al Inhabitants, uncore ceo nest ascun [alcun?) Nusans, 
car Ie needfulness de eux dispensera ove Ie noisomness del smell." [If a man makes candles in a 
town, by which he causes a noisome scent to the inhabitants, still there is no nuisance, for the 
needfulness of them (the candles) will excuse the noisomeness of the smell.) Also noted in I W. 
HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 263 (1787) (expresses doubt that such a strict exculpation from 
liability should prevail where alternative locations in less populated areas were available, i.e., that 
the exculpation should depend upon a showing of locational necessity). My gratitude and con-
gratulations to Stefan Riesenfeld, Professor of Law, Boalt Hall, University of California, Berkeley, 
for having located the original quotation. 
49. See O. Fiss, supra note 2, at 76-76; C. SAINT GERMAN, THE DIALOGUES BETWEEN A 
DOCTOR OF DIVINITY AND A STUDENT IN THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 77-80,88-130 (Selden Society 
ed. 1974) (1st ed. London 1543). 
50. I J. POMEROY, supra note 33, at ch. 1. 
51. The Ducktown view, and the modem trend, is that liability for tort damages is a separate 
question from the decision to enjoin. See 113 Tenn. at 358, 83 S. W. at 664. See also Harrison v. 
Indiana Auto-Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1121-22 (7th Cir. 1976); Rabin, Nuisance Law: Re-
thinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1299 (1977); infra note 60. In negligence based 
tort liability, of course, the unreasonableness of defendant's action is an element of the tort and 
thus incorporates a balancing of utilities in the initial liability question itself. 
52. At the threshold stage in such cases, equitable balancing would be involved only in the 
equity based affirmative defenses at law, such as coming to the nuisance, laches, and other 
estoppels. 
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b. Abatement 
Perhaps the grandest pitfall of equity jurisprudence is the tendency 
for lawyers and judges to equate the judicial decision to abate a de-
fendant's conduct (the second type of equity balancing) with the judi-
cial choice of an injunction remedy (the third type of equity balancing). 
But the abatement decision and the choice of remedy are not the same. 
Abatement, whether total or partial, is a functional term referring to 
the decision to restrict the defendant's activity. It is this functional de-
cision that is taken over when a statute declares a mandatory rule of 
conduct. Injunctions, in their multiple variety, are merely remedial di-
rectives designed to implement the court's determinations on threshold 
questions, substantive liability, and future conduct, which mayor may 
not include abatement. In fact, of course, the vast majority of abate-
ments are implemented by injunction, and the vast majority of injunc-
tions issued in the private law field are abatements. 53 
The mistaken but understandable confusion of the abatement de-
cision with the choice of remedy reflects the modem acceptance of in-
junctions as the normal remedy of choice. But lumping the two 
together obscures the fact that they constitute two separate judicial de-
cisions. While most judges, attorneys, and commentators discuss eq-
uity cases in terms of whether an injunction will issue, the functional 
result apparently concerns them more than the particular design of the 
remedy: Will defendant's conduct be permitted to continue? Which 
form of conduct will be affirmed for the future and which 
subordinated? Will the court establish a rule for future conduct that 
prevents further tort injuries to the plaintiffs or relegate them to se-
quential damage actions?54 
The second type of equitable inquiry-the determination of con-
tending conducts-was the heart of the Ducktown case. Since they 
could not coexist, would the court permit the farms or the mills to con-
tinue? The question presented both a legal and an equitable aspect. 
First, it had to be established that the mills were subject to tort liability 
as a private nuisance. 55 The outcome of that inquiry determined the 
53. No statistical surveys exist on point, but both conclusions appear intuitively to be true, a 
position concurred in by Professor Fiss. Telephone conversation with Professor Owen Fiss of 
Yale University (Mar. 11, 1982). 
54. It is, of course, possible that a crushing damage award against defendants will equally 
abate the defendant's conduct without an equity decision, but almost by definition damage suits 
cannot capture all of the real costs of an activity. There is slippage, for example, in the ability to 
litigate far-ftung injuries and in the need to pay attorneys. Abatement injunctions do prevent all 
such future damages, albeit without a delicate cost accounting. 
55. The Ducktown court had no difficulty in finding tort liability for damages. 113 Tenn. at 
350,366-67,83 S.W. at 662, 666-67. Where a state follows the early cases and does not differenti-
ate between damage liability and abatement liability, the basic element of comparative utility 
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question of compensation for past injuries suffered by plaintiffs. A neg-
ative determination would have eliminated further equity questions. 
But the court found that the smelters constituted a tort, and that trig-
gered the balance of equities on the abatement question. 
The Ducktown abatement question focused on the desirability and 
consequences of the competing forms of conduct, considering relative 
hardship between the parties, the balance of comparative social utility 
between the two competing conducts, and the public interest (which 
usually amounts to the same thing).56 The court declared: 
A judgment for damages in this class of cases is a matter of absolute 
right, where injury is shown. A decree for an injunction is a matter of 
sound legal discretion, to be granted or withheld as that discretion shall 
dictate, after a full and careful consideration of every element apper-
taining to the injury.57 
Citing a series of equity cases in which the utility of defendant's enter-
prises weighed against injunctions,58 the court's "careful consideration" 
began with a question that virtually answered itself: 
Shall the complainants be granted, by way of damages, the full meas-
ure of relief to which their injuries entitle them or shall we go further, 
and grant their request to blot out two great mining and manufacturing 
enterprises, destroy half of the taxable values of a county, and drive 
more than 10,000 people from their homes?59 
(drawn from equity) may result in eliminating the plaintiff's entire cause of action, legal as well as 
equitable, at this initial stage. 
56. This balance is fundamentally a fairness question limited to the two parties involved. It 
reflects public interest only insofar as the public interest is served by the expectation that equitable 
determinations will incorporate some sense of proportionality between private litigants. 
57. 113 Tenn. at 358, 83 S.W. at 664. 
58. /d at 358-63, 83 S.W. at 664-66. 
59. /d at 366-67, 83 S.W. at 666-67. The court continued: 
In order to protect by injunction several small tracts of land, aggregating in value less 
than $1,000, we are asked to destroy other property worth nearly $2,000,000, and wreck 
two great mining and manufacturing enterprises, that are engaged in work of very great 
importance, not only to their owners, but to the State, and to the whole country as well, 
to depopulate a large town, and deprive thousands of working people of their homes and 
livelihood, and scatter them broadcast. 
/d The court then raised questions of political philosophy as well as economic utility: 
[W]e are deeply sensible of the truth of the proposition that no man is entitled to any 
more rights than another on the ground that he has or owns more property than that 
other. But in a case of conflicting rights, where neither party can enjoy his own without 
in some measure restricting the liberty of the other in the use of property, the law must 
make the best arrangement it can between the contending parties, with a view to preserv-
ing to each one the largest measure of liberty possible under the circumstances. We see 
no escape from the conclusion in the present case that the only proper decree is to allow 
the complainants. . . damages, and that the injunction must be denied to them . . . . 
/d at 367, 83 S.W. at 667. 
The fact that it was land that was injured in this case, and that each parcel of land is unique 
in the eyes of equity, see supra note 38, indicates that this was not just a decision based on the 
threshold question of adequacy of legal remedies. The same distinction is made in the federal 
courts. See Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337-39 (1933). The .Ducktown 
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The Ducktown decision launched a modem trend in private nui-
sance cases, clearly separating the questions of liability and abatement 
and requiring defendants whose continued operations serve public wel-
fare nevertheless to absorb the cost of injuries imposed on neighbors as 
a cost of doing business.6o It also stands as a paradigm of equitable 
balancing in determining the abatement of future conduct. In deter-
mining that defendants' conduct could continue despite inevitable fu-
ture injury to plaintiffs, the court compared the parties' private interests 
and balanced their interests against the court's own view of public wel-
fare. True, a more modem court might well have brought more public 
and private values such as health, water quality, and aesthetics into the 
balance.61 Yet the Ducktown court opened the equitable balance to a 
wide-ranging review of competing values and made its decision based 
court further noted that granting plaintiffs' requested injunction ''would be practically a confisca-
tion of the property of the defendants for the benefit of the complainants," an appropriation with-
out compensation, whereas plaintiffs would get compensation. 226 Tenn. at 367, 83 S.W. at 667. 
Despite the J)ucktown analysis, some of the same defendants were subsequently permanently en-
joined for a time in a suit brought by the state of Georgia. The Supreme Court held that interstate 
pollution presented different equities from those involved in the tort balance in Ducktown. Geor-
gia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (bill in equity), decree entered, 237 U.S. 474 and 
237 U.S. 678 (1915), modified, 240 U.S. 680 (1916). 
60. This approach implements the modem economic efficiency analysis that holds such com-
pensation to be a straightforward, if partial, internalization of external costs. If the requirement of 
paying such consequent damages forces a polluting enterprise to shut down, that is an indication 
that the enterprise was marginal in the first place, subsidized by negative burdens borne by the 
neighbors' property. Inaccuracies and dislocations also exist in the cost accounting process, of 
course. On the defendant's side, some awards, like punitive damages, cannot be characterized as 
representing actual costs; hence, they may skew economic utility. On the plaintiffs side, it can be 
noted that many real external cost burdens are nonmonetizable, hence uncompensated. Further, 
the costs of sequential litigation ensure that plaintiffs do not recover their full losses. Accordingly, 
the equally classic case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970), took a further step toward cost allocation by authorizing courts to assess 
damage awards for future "permanent" damages, instead of the J)ucktown remedy ofrepeated tort 
suits for past damages. The measure of permanent damages in Boomer, however, was irrationally 
figured on base market values that did not take account of potential appreciation absent the pollu-
tion. See Boomer, 55 Misc. 2d 1023, 1025-26,287 N.Y.S.2d 112, U5 (1967), aJl'd, 30 A.D.2d 480, 
294 N.Y.S.2d,452 (1968), rev'd, 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). 
61. Aside from one passing reference to one plaintiffs wife's cough and headache, 113 Tenn. 
at 341, 83 S.W. at 660, the court did not mention health effects to the plaintiffs, far less to the 
public. A modem analysis would undoubtedly have weighed such factors as the negative effects 
on health and property attributable to the smelters (though far removed in time or distance), 
economic burdens on community services, and ecological damages, which would have resulted in 
a far more comprehensive economic assessment of the case. Cf, Keeton & Morris, Notes on Bal-
ancing the EqUities, 18 TEX. L. REV. 412, 420 (1940) (commending those courts which have 
awarded damages not only to plaintiffs but to others similarly situated). Even the relatively recent 
Boomer case, however, did not do so, but instead balanced only plaintiffs' individual injuries, and 
not similar public injuries, against a combination of the corporation's property stake and the pub-
lic's interest in jobs, in determining whether the defendant's conduct should be abated. Boomer v. 
Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 226, 257 N.E.2d 870, 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 318 (1970). See 
also Spur Industries v. Del Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972) (conditioning 
injunction on the late-coming plaintiffs payment of relocation damages to the defendant). 
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upon its own subjective judgment of the relative intrinsic values of 
competing conducts. 
Thus, the nonstatutory setting provides an inclusive model of equi-
table discretion in the determination of contending conducts. In tradi-
tional common law cases, the court-made rules of conduct which 
determined damage liability were more or less rigidified in the evolved 
tort doctrines, while the equitable question of abatement was decided 
anew in each case. The tort debts owed by one party to the other might 
be decided by uniformly applicable substantive tort principles, but 
questions of the life and death of farms and smelting plants-of who 
must stop and who may go on-were left in the flexible hands and 
heart of equity.62 In short, courts have used equity to define and exer-
cise a separate judicial role, grounded upon a rational discretion and 
working beyond the rigid rules of the law. 
3. Tailoring the Remedies 
Having defined and distinguished the first two kinds of discretion-
ary balancing, the third role of equity becomes anticlimactic, though 
important. At this point in a lawsuit, law and equity have determined 
all the substantive issues, and only the equitable function of implemen-
tation remains. If the court had decided in the second stage balance 
that defendant's conduct may continue, the award of legal damages for 
past injuries ends the question of remedy. In that situation no equita-
ble remedy is necessary unless required to enforce payment of 
damages.63 
When the court determines that defendant's conduct may not con-
tinue, on the other hand, a full array of equitable options exists. If 
defendants agree to abate their activity voluntarily, the court has the 
option of not issuing any formal equitable remedy at all. This point is 
important in the statutory setting, as will be seen shortly.64 It is taken 
for granted in the common law setting: an injunction need not issue if 
62. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-39 (1907) (bill in equity), decree 
entered, 237 U.S. 474 and 237 U.S. 678 (1915), mod!fted, 240 U.S. 650 (1916). 
63. For example, the Ducktown court temporarily enjoined continued operation of the smelt-
ers until bonds were posted to assure payment of damages. 113 Tenn. at 368, 83 s.w. at 667. The 
injunction threat was used because there was some question of the defendant's financial ability to 
pay the plaintiffs in the short term; the injunction would issue unless the corporation posted a 
bond to secure the payment of the judgment. ld The same kind of "conditional" injunction was 
issued in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,228,257 N.E.2d 870,875,309 N.Y.S.2d 
312, 319 (1970). 
The issuance of the injunction pending compensation is more than a gratuitous symbol, be-
cause it adds the practical leverage of potential economic deprivation (provisional abatement of 
defendant's enterprise) to hasten payment of the legal damages instead of relegating plaintiff to 
the position of a creditor holding a chose in action. 
64. See infra text accompanying notes 93-108, 166-92. 
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the court finds that the abatement decision will be implemented with-
out it, but will usually issue where there is any doubt on the matter.65 
Between these two extremes lies the declaratory judgment, a remedy 
slightly more formal and more assertive than the no-injunction option 
but similarly unenforceable through contempt proceedings. Yet in the 
case of good faith defendants, a declaratory judgment or less may be all 
that is necessary to implement the court's abatement decision.66 
The strength and flexibility of injunctions, however, makes them 
attractive as the remedy of choice in many cases. Equity courts shape 
injunctions in multifarious forms: injunctions to halt an enterprise 
completely, to shut down a particular component activity, to scale 
down overall activity by a certain percentage, to halt a specific offensive 
effect, to abate after a lapse of a specific term if certain performance 
standards are not achieved-these are but a few.67 Injunctions also 
serve different tactical ends. They can be wielded to drag a rambunc-
tiously recalcitrant defendant into compliance, to tighten the reins on 
slipshod defendants whose compliance efforts may be sloppy, or merely 
to add a final reassuring level of certainty to a good faith defendant's 
compliance. In short, "The plastic remedies of the chancery are 
moulded to the needs of justice."68 
Analytically, the third stage remedy decision involves a weighing 
of the comparative efficacy of available remedies rather than a compar-
ative weighing of interests. Since the tailoring of remedies involves 
choices between options, shaped by the court's judgment about the 
65. The only evident exceptions would be where injunctions would be unenforceable and 
futile. See supra note 28. 
66. This is an important point that reappears later in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 
(1944), discussed at length infra in text accompanying notes 73-112. Thus, for instance, a major 
point of Michigan law-the prevention of multiple subdivision-lot canal access to inland lakes-
was litigated as a declaratory judgment, out of recognition that once rights were declared, the 
parties would comply. Thompson v. Em, 379 Mich. 667, 674passim, 154 N.W.2d 473, 477 passim 
(1967). See a/so Colorado v. First Nat'l Bank, 540 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1976); Philadelphia Citi-
zens in Action v. Schweiker, 527 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1981). It should be noted further that 
declaratory judgments are not clearly categorizable as equitable or legal remedies, see Beacon 
Theaters v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959) (treating them as purely legal remedies), but 
derive from statute when part of the equity jurisdiction, and take on the quality, chameleon-like, 
of the cause of action on which they are based. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 93 (1971) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); H. McCUNTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES 
OF EQUITY § 51, at 121 (2d ed. 1948); I J. POMEROY, supra note 33, at 228-29. 
67. See 5 J. POMEROY, supra note 33, § 1948 (2d ed. 1919). 
68. Foreman v. Foreman, 251 N.Y. 237, 238, 167 N.E. 428, 429 (1929) (Cardozo, J.) (a case 
based upon equity's constructive trust doctrine). Thus Judge Jasen, dissenting in Boomer, argued 
that an appropriate remedy in light of the public interest in clean air was to encourage innovative 
technology through an abatement injunction effective after 18 months. Boomer v. Atlantic Ce-
ment Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 231, 257 N.E.2d 870, 877, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 322 (1970) (Jasen, J., 
dissenting). 
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practicalities and relative effectiveness of those options, it does no vio-
lence to the term "balance of equities" to include this latter balance 
within it. 
Recognizing that courts sitting in equity do compare the available 
alternatives in deciding what remedy to issue to effectuate the prior 
decision on the merits clarifies the fact that the remedy choice is a sepa-
rate decision. Separating the role of equity into its three components 
also establishes a useful analytical framework for the modem statutory 
injunction. 
III 
BALANCING THE EQUITIES IN THE STATUTORY CONTEXT 
The exercise of equitable jurisdiction, particularly the availability 
of injunctions, has increased over the years. The anachronistic require-
ment of a property interest in order to invoke equity69 has been 
scrapped of necessity, and other impediments have been removed.70 
Despite regular protestations to the contrary, 71 the status of the injunc-
tion as an extraordinary remedy has evaporated. The injunction has 
become a common, widely used judicial remedy precisely because of its 
ability to fine-tune the requirements of private conduct in a complex, 
modem society. Its development parallels the expansion of cases, espe-
cially in civil rights and other constitutional areas, where damage reme-
69. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). See O. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 41 (1978). 
The anachronistic nature of the property requirement for issuance of injunctions was repeatedly 
demonstrated, as in the Debs case where the government had to claim a property interest in the 
U.S. mails in order to request an injunction against the labor organizer's putatively dangerous 
utterings. 
The arguments for maintaining the exceptional character of the injunction find their basis in 
particular political pragmatics-for example, in the 1930's and 1940's in an aversion to the broad 
availability of labor injunctions against collective employee actions, see F. FRANKFURTER & N. 
GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) (making an extensive argument for restricted use of such 
injunctions), and more recently, in a general opposition to the alleged social activism of courts. 
The controversies arising in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
and the civil rights housing cases, for example, have been directed more to the process of judicially 
ordered remedies than to the courts' declarations of the law involved. 
70. Among the other lowered barriers to equitable jurisdiction are the decline of the irrepa-
rability requirement and the willingness to enjoin what arguably may be criminal activity. See O. 
FISS, supra note 69, at ch. III; 7 J. MOORE, supra note 2, ~ 65.04(1). 
71. E.g., United States v. Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187,192 (3d Cir. 1980); Kaynard v. Mego 
Corp., 633 F.2d 1026, 1033 (2d Cir. 1980); Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chems., 614 F.2d 
351,356 (3d Cir. 1979); Carter v. Taylor, 409 F. Supp. 1162, 1164 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (citing Frank-
furter, J., in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941»; Drummond Citizens 
Ins. Co. v. Sergeant, 266 Ark. 611, -,588 S.W.2d 419,424 (1979); Agricultural Labor Relations 
Bd. v. Ruline Nursery Co., liS Cal. App. 3d 1005, lOIS, 171 Cal. Rptr. 793, 797 (1981); Waterbury 
Teachers Assoc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 178 Conn. 573, 576, 424 A.2d 271, 273 (1979); Delano v. 
Collins, 49 Ill. App. 3d 791, 795, 364 N.E.2d 716, 720 (1977). 
- -- ----------------
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dies are insufficient or miss the point. 72 
Yet in a time of unparalleled statutory proliferation, the flourish-
ing of the equity jurisdiction, especially the wide use of injunctions, 
presents a paradox. The opportunities for employing equitable discre-
tion have increased over recent years. In part this is a function of in-
creased common law litigation in the environmental and consumer law 
areas; in part it is a function of constitutional litigation; in largest part, 
however, it derives from the growth of the regulatory state. In the first 
two areas--(:ommon law and constitutional cases~iscretion has al-
ways been and remains at the heart of equity jurisdiction. But when 
Congress and state legislatures create a succession of declaratory stat-
utes administered by executive agencies, a paradox appears: the oppor-
tunities for exercise of equity jurisdiction have multiplied at the same 
time that the scope of equitable discretion seems to have been 
truncated. 
The existence of statutes inevitably makes as much a difference for 
equity jurisprudence as it does for the common law. Statutes codify 
particular standards of conduct and declare public policy. Just as it 
does not seem surprising that common law rules, such as those pertain-
ing to unfair competition, can be superseded by statutes like the anti-
trust acts, it should not be surprising that the application of equitable 
principles can be fundamentally changed by statute. 
To what extent, however, do statutes change equitable discretion? 
Do they merely add a clear element of public policy to the balance of 
equities, leaving all options open for the court's exercise of discretion in 
the three traditional stages of balance, or do they eliminate discretion 
in one or more of the three areas? The resolution of this crucial issue 
depends in part on the functional distinctions we have discerned in 
traditional equitable jurisprudence; it must also incorporate a careful 
analysis of one particular New Deal case that dominates modem dis-
cussions of statutory violations and equitable discretion. 
A. The Hecht Case 
A much-cited but little-analyzed 1944 price control case,?3 Hecht 
Co. v. Bowles, 74 dominates the debate on the effect of statutes on the 
equity powers of courts. In Hecht the Supreme Court resoundingly de-
72. O. FISS, supra note 69, at 4-6; see also id. chs. III, IV; Developments, supra note 16, at 
998-1001. 
73. Of the two published analyses of the case, only one briefly discussed the equitable princi-
ples of injunctive necessity. 28 MARQ. L. REV. 128, 130 (1944). The other gave more attention to 
the political consequences of Hecht's limitation on overzealous bureaucrats than to equitable doc-
trine. 32 GEO. L.J. 449, 452 (1944). Fiss' discussion of Hecht focuses on the fact that the injunc-
tion remedy seemed mandatory on the face of the statute. O. FISS, supra note 2, at 98-100. 
74. 321 U.S. 321 (1944). 
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nied an injunction in the face of clear statutory violations. Upon un-
critical reading, therefore, Hecht is often thought to imply a judicial 
power to permit statutory noncompliance.75 But a closer reading of 
Hecht, in the special setting in which the case arose, defines a much 
more careful line between courts and legislatures. The Hecht case was 
based upon three important features: a clearly established record of 
past statutory violations, an almost equally clear showing that viola-
tions would not recur, and a statute that seemed to dictate injunctive 
relief on the basis of past violations alone without regard to present 
compliance. 
The existence of overcharging violations prohibited by the war-
time Emergency Price Control Act76 was not really at issue in Hecht. 
Between May and October of 1942 the Hecht Company department 
stores had clearly sold consumer goods at prices which, in hundreds of 
instances, violated the Act. Hecht made no serious attempt to deny the 
past violations.77 Instead, the company argued that the violations were 
attributable to the understandable difficulties encountered in the initial 
application of a complex piece of economic regulation to a large and 
highly diversified commercial enterprise. The violations were not the 
result of bad faith, they argued; the overcharges would be returned 
where possible and otherwise given to charity. More important for the 
Court in Hecht-and more significant for the present argument-the 
defendant was determined to comply with the law in the future and 
had taken practical measures to ensure compliance. Hecht had cor-
rected sales procedures, trained its personnel, and updated inventory 
procedures.78 The trial court had found that there was no substantial 
likelihood that violations would recur.79 This was the fundamental 
75. See, e.g., Winner, supra note 35, at 506 (concluding that "[c)ourts ... usually balance 
the equities before issuing an injunction. . . for violation of environmental statutes."). See also 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1972); FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1084 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981); Parkview Heights Corp. v. City of Blackjack, 605 F.2d 1033, 1036 (8th Cir. 1979); 
Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 706 (D.P.R. 1979), aff'd in parI and vacaled in parI, 643 F.2d 
835 (1st Cir.), cerl. granled sub nom. Weinberger V. Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct. 88 (1981), dis-
cussed infra in text accompanying notes 243-63. 
76. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (terminated 1947). 
77. The Hecht Company formally continued to deny the violations, apparently on estoppel 
grounds, Brown v. Hecht Co., 137 F.2d 689,690 (D.C. Cir. 1943), rev'd, 321 U.S. 321 (1944). But 
the evidence was clear that the store was in disorder in terms of compliance; spotchecks consist-
ently turned up violations, seven of which were made the formal basis of the complaint. Id. at 
691. 
78. Id. at 690. 
79. 321 U.S. at 326 (citing district court opinion, 49 F. Supp. at 532). The Office of Price 
Administration (OPA) was sure that further violations would inevitably occur. Interview with the 
late Professor Fleming James, Jr., former OPA assistant counsel (July 15, 1981). Professor James 
had argued Hechl in the lower courts. But the Court's position is consistent even if it accepted the 
fact that some further violations were inevitable given the statute's complexity. An injunction 
would not deter involuntary violations, and the courts were unlikely to punish such violations in 
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The Hecht Court's deference to congressional definitions of pro-
hibited conduct certainly comports with a legal system composed of 
both court-made and legislated rules. The most common function of 
statutes is to make substantive rules of conduct that otherwise are 
made, if at all, by law and equity acting together. To argue that courts 
possess the power, case by case, to suspend statutory rules of conduct, 
often in areas in which no prior common law rules exist, is to argue for 
an unusual expansion of judicial power that would have surprised both 
King and Chancellor. Rather, like the canon that statutes in deroga-
tion of common law will be construed narrowly (which does not mean 
that statutes cannot derogate common law), Hecht declared that stat-
utes in derogation of equitable discretion will also be strictly con-
strued.92 Strict construction of statutes is a very different proposition 
from judicial overrides of statutory rules of conduct. 
Hecht's major focus was on the third area of equitable discretion, 
the choice of remedy to implement and accommodate the congressional 
rule. The district court had fashioned a judicial remedy that consisted 
of no remedy: having specifically found that compliance with the stat-
ute had already been achieved and that future violations were unlikely, 
it dismissed the complaint. The question on certiorari was whether the 
statute allowed the district court to do this93 and, if so, whether dismis-
sal was a proper resolution for this case or an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion. The latter point was remanded,94 so the authority question 
was the only one decided. 
In part, Hecht's determination of a qualified judicial right to tailor 
remedies rested upon statutory interpretation. The Court determined 
at the outset that the statutory language did not clearly mandate the 
issuance of an injunction when a violation had been proved. Section 
205(a) said the court "shall" grant a "permanent or temporary injunc-
tion, restraining order, or other order,"95 and the Court noted that in 
some cases this could mean as little as an order maintaining jurisdic-
tion over the case pending compliance.96 "Thus it seems that § 205(a) 
92. 321 u.s. at 330. 
93. Note the approach of another commentator who participated in the controversy: "Con-
gress could punish the violation as a crime; obviously Congress could make it an occasion for an 
injunction. Some states had done away with chancery altogether. Could not the nation-espe-
ciaJly in wartime-modify chancery's operation?" C. REMBAR, supra note 80, at 313. 
94. 321 U.S. at 330-3J. 
95. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 205(a), 56 Stat. 23, 33 (terminated 1947) 
(emphasis added). 
96. 321 U.S. at 328-29 (adopting the approach of Judge Grover's dissent below, 137 F.2d at 
696). This interpretation, and a related construction limiting § 205(a) to the status of a grant of 
jurisdiction to issue injunctions without bonds, found some support in the legislative history. 321 
U.S. at 328. Further, it is clear that § 205(a) did not require the OPA to request an injunction 
whenever a violation was found. It would have been surprising, in fact, if this had been the case, 
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falls short of making mandatory the issuance of an injunction merely 
because the Administrator asks for it."97 Given the ambiguity of the 
statute and its legislative history,98 the Court recognized a limitation on 
equitable discretion but declined to construe it as a broad override. 
Courts are not free to fashion their own substantive rules; rather "their 
discretion. . . must be exercised in light of the large objectives of the 
Act."99 Thus, the Hecht Court chose the statutory interpretation 
"which affords a full opportunity to treat enforcement proceedings 
under this [Act] in accordance with ... traditional practices, as condi-
tioned by the necessities of the public interest which Congress has 
sought to protect."JOO 
In Hecht the necessity of statutory compliance wholly "condi-
tioned" equity's choice of remedy. The Court repeatedly stressed that 
compliance with the congressional rule of conduct was mandatory, and 
equity served that compliance requirement. A court cannot exercise its 
discretion so as to reduce "the large objectives of the Act" to merely 
one factor in an independent balance of equities on compliance. 
"[The] courts are given jurisdiction to issue whatever order to enforce 
compliance is proper in the circumstances of each particular case."JOJ 
An injunction need not issue if some other order "would be as practi-
cally effective as the issuance of an injunction."J02 In the case of 
Hecht's price control violations, the injunction was properly denied be-
and it appears that the OPA did not request injunctions for every violation encountered. Note, 
The Statutory Injunction as an Enforcement Weapon of Federal Agencies, 57 YALE L.J. 1023, 1027 
(1948). Thus, the Court might well have concluded that the statute implied an intermediary 
agency decision to request an injunction from the courts, and in the Hecht Company's circum-
stances the OPA's decision to request an injunction was an act reviewable for abuse of discretion 
regarding the congressional price control purposes. In that light, the Court's decision might stand 
for a judgment that the OPA's request had no rational basis, hence was arbitrary and capricious or 
an abuse of discretion, and the section did not apply. 
97. 321 U.S. at 328. Recognition of the variety of orders available is another affirmation of 
the traditional scope of discretion at the third stage of litigation. 
98. The Court found that the Senate Report could be argued either way, 321 U.S. at 328, 
which reflects rather badly on the OPA's efforts at writing legislative history. See supra note 85. 
99. 321 U.S. at 331. This distinction had been made under other statutes in a series oflower 
court cases which the Court did not deem necessary to cite, although they had been briefed. In 
SEC v. Otis & Co., 18 F. Supp. 100 (S.D. Ohio 1940), for example, an injunction would not issue 
where future violations had not been shown to be likely. In Walling v. Peavy-Wilson Lumber 
Co., 49 F. Supp. 846 (W.O. La. 1943), an injunction issued, even though violations had ceased 
shortly prior to the action, apparently because the defendants' past conduct did not warrant faith 
in their continued statutory compliance. See infra text accompanying notes 148-49. 
100. 321 U.S. at 330. 
101. Id at 329, (emphasis added) (citing the Price Control Act's S. REP. No. 931, 77th Cong., 
2d Sess. 10 (1942». It is not unusual that this might result in a variety of different decrees in 
enforcement actions under the same statute. "[An equity] decree in one case will seldom be an 
exact counterpart of a decree in another." TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 213 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
102. 321 U.S. at 328. The alternative discussed-an order retaining district court jurisdic-
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cause it would do nothing to assure better compliance. 103 In such cir-
cumstances, deterrence was not at issue; the only function of an 
injunction would be to punish Hecht for past misdeeds, a task that eq-
uity tries to avoid. 104 
The Hecht Court held that "the cessation of violations, whether 
before or after the institution of a suit by the Administrator, is no bar to 
the issuance of an injunction .... "105 The touchstone was the likeli-
hood of future violations. When they were unlikely to occur, no in-
junction was necessary. The Court noted that "[a] grant of jurisdiction 
to issue injunctions is of course not a requirement that they be is-
sued."I06 "[W]e do not think that under all circumstances the court 
must issue the injunction or other order which the Administrator 
seeks."107 Still, the room thus provided for the exercise of equitable 
discretion was firmly grounded upon the assurance of future compli-
ance with the statute. 108 
Hecht also addressed the possibility that statutes might impose 
some limitations on initial threshold equitable determinations, "[f]or 
the standards of the public interest, not the requirements of private liti-
gation, measure the propriety and need for injunctive relief in these 
cases."I09 Although the Court used this language to articulate the co-
operative nature of courts and agencies in implementing the substan-
tive policies of statutes, it has subsequently been taken to support 
departures in the statutory context from the traditionally required 
threshold showings. 110 
Nor was this the only limitation of judicial discretion recognized 
in Hecht. The decision also contains implicit recognition of the fact 
that Congress could have removed all discretion from price control 
tion-was thus based on the finding of voluntary compliance which obviated the necessity for an 
injunction. 
The statutory phrase "or other order" (which Hecht construed as manifesting the traditional 
panoply of available equitable remedy choices) could perhaps also be stretched to include the 
order of dismissal issued by the trial court in that case. See supra note 96. Or, if some affirmative 
order were required by § 205(a) when a past violation was proved, the court could achieve the 
same result by deciding that the OPA abused its discretion in bringing the complaint in the first 
place, thereby sidestepping the section's purported mandate. 
103. 321 U.S. at 326. 
104. Id at 329. 
105. Id at 327. See United States v. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). 
106. 321 U.S. at 329 (emphasis omitted). 
107. Id at 32S. 
lOS. Id at 326, 329. 
109. Id at 331. "These cases" referred to the cases cited in a prior paragraph discussing 
various situations where courts were involved with regulatory statutes and agencies, as in United 
States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. IS3, 191 (1939). 
110. See cases cited infra notes 157-65. 
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cases, even if it was held not to have done so. 111 Thus, Hecht clearly 
did not hold that Congress lacks the power to reduce the scope of the 
courts' equitable jurisdiction. 112 
Far from securing an unfettered equitable discretion, Hecht articu-
lated a limited role for equity. Courts are to be guided by public policy 
in interpreting the traditional threshold tests, constricted in all cases by 
Congress' substantive rules of conduct, and potentially constrained 
even as to choice of remedy. Accordingly, Hecht, the leading case re-
garding the relationship between equity and statutes, established two 
major points. First, unless Congress explicitly demands that a particu-
lar remedy be applied to all violations of a statute, the courts retain 
equitable discretion in choosing a remedy to enforce the statute. So 
stated, this principle will be rarely contested, and, though important, it 
is not very interesting. Second, when a statutory violation is proved, 
equitable discretion is to be exercised as necessary to achieve statutory 
compliance. Hecht leaves no room for the proposition that the tradi-
tional balance of equities applicable to common law litigation remains 
unfettered so as to allow the courts to permit continued statutory non-
compliance. For our purposes, this second principle is the more inter-
esting. Unfortunately, in Hecht and the cases that cite Hecht, it was 
lost in the brouhaha accompanying the first. 
B. Reading Hecht 
The Hecht Court's panegyric to equitable discretion, when consid-
ered without regard to the case's factual and procedural setting, has 
been responsible for a large measure of the subsequent confusion char-
111. 321 U.S. at 329-30 ("[Ilf Congress had intended to make such a drastic departure from 
the traditions of equity practice, an unequivocal statement of its purpose would have been 
made."). 
112. It is difficult to argue that legislatures could not, if they desired to do so and did so 
explicitly and unequivocally, take over the entire field of a court's equitable discretion in all three 
areas of balancing of equities, at least in a statute-based action. A statute could say: "A person 
who has suffered injury as defined in this statute may maintain an action without regard to avail-
able affirmative defenses," eliminating equity's threshold discretion; it could provide that once the 
elements of a violation have been proved, a court must see to it that the defendants' conduct cease 
(or alternatively that damages only may be assessed); and finally the statute could legislate a 
precise remedy, e.g., "a permanent injunction immediately abating the activity shall issue in all 
such cases," or alternatively that only a damages remedy will issue. It may well be, however, that 
Congress could not do so with regard to the adjudication of constitutional rights or vested com-
mon law rights, at least as to issues of permanent equitable relief. As to administrative law ac-
tions, the courts' article III jurisdiction and the adjudicatory rights of the sixth and seventh 
amendments stand in a different posture when they relate to ad judicable issues which existed in 
1789 and when they relate to new statutory schemes which may be consigned in part or in totality 
to an administrative process created for the purpose. See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA, 430 
U.S. 442 (1977). Other limitations, even affecting constitutional claims, can be legislated as to 
interlocutory relief, if permanent relief is thereafter available. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 
414,439-42 (1944). 
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acterizing discussions of the relationship between equitable jurisdiction 
and statutes. Many decisions simply overlook Hecht's fundamental in-
sistence on statutory compliance. 
Although many examples of the phenomenon are available, 113 one 
notable recent opinion that used Hecht's broad language without rec-
ognizing its insistence on compliance is Justice Rehnquist's dissent in 
T~ v. Hill, 114 the Tellico Dam "snail darter" case, discussed further in 
Part IV of this Article. 115 At this point it will be helpful to contrast 
Justice Rehnquist's analysis of the equitable discretion question with 
the analysis in the Hecht opinion, the case on which he placed principal 
reliance. 
Quoting Hecht, Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Hill noted that" 'a 
grant of jurisdiction to issue compliance orders hardly suggests an ab-
solute duty to do so under any and all circumstances. . . .' [T]he dis-
trict court possessed discretion to refuse injunctive relief even though it 
had found a violation of the Act .... "116 So far, this goes no further 
than Hecht, where the injunction was denied on proof of future statu-
tory compliance. The dissent in Hill, however, continued by saying 
that "the only remaining question is whether this discretion was abused 
in denying ... an injunction."ll7 This formulation of the issue missed 
Hecht's fundamental requirement of statutory compliance. It at-
tempted to assert that a district court can refuse to enjoin statutory vio-
lations, not because statutory compliance was assured, but rather 
because in the district judge's personal opinion, the statutory "interest 
on one side of the balance was more than outweighed by other equally 
significant factors . . . , including significant public and social harms 
that would flow from such relief and. . . the demonstrated good faith 
of petitioner." 118 
This is a major leap. Reading Hecht accurately to say that equita-
ble discretion is not completely eliminated by a statute absent an ex-
plicit congressional declaration, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the 
court therefore had an unlimited ability to override the statute. If the 
113. See supra note 75. 
114. 437 U.S. 153, 211 (1978). 
115. See infra text accompanying notes 298-304. 
116. 437 U.S. at 212, 213 (quoting Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329) (emphasis omitted). The same 
thing can be said of Justice Rehnquist as was said of Harvard's Professor Joseph H. Beale (1861-
1945): that it is possible to refute his arguments, but never if you let him state the question. A.J. 
CASNER & W.B. LEACH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 83 n.3 (2d ed. 1968). See, e.g., 
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 518, 538 (1978); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 147-48 (1974) (plurality opinion); 
Florida E. Coast Ry. v. ICC, 410 U.S. 224 (1973). 
117. 437 U.S. at 212. 
118. Id at 213. 
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statute does not completely restrict the equity court's discretion, it does 
not restrict it at all. It is not clear either logically or from the text of 
Hecht that the case can carry this added burden. The OPA had argued 
in Hecht that the statute had removed equitable discretion at all three 
traditional stages-threshold access to the courts, the determination of 
conduct, and the tailoring of remedies. According to Justice Rehn-
quist's interpretation, the Court's rejection of the OPA claim left the 
equity jurisdiction at the other extreme, unhindered by the statute in 
any of these three aspects. 
Courts that cite Hecht for the existence of a power to refuse in-
junctive relief without noting Hecht's insistence on statutory compli-
ance make the classic mistake of confusing the choice of remedy with 
the abatement decision itself.119 Hecht's assertions of equitable discre-
tion in the choice of remedy were all addressed to the effectuation of 
the congressional command. The Supreme Court presumed that Con-
119. This was the basis of the Rehnquist dissent. The point, however, had been argued in 
Hill: 
c.J. BURGER: Do you suggest that any of the legislation passed here has abro-
gated the normal equity function of a United States District Judge in granting an injunc-
tion, the very extraordinary relief that is sought here . . . are you suggesting that he 
should not function as he does with any other application for an injunction? 
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS: We do not advocate the stripping of this 
Court or any court of the equitable powers ... that is to say, the equity courts have the 
full panoply of powers required to enforce the laws of Congress. 
J. REHNQUIST: But Hecht against Bowles says you don't get an injunction auto-
matically for a statutory violation. 
COUNSEL: That's correct, Your Honor. And we do not insist on an injunction. If 
petitioner agreed to obey the law voluntarily, as the Hecht Corporation did in that case, 
or as the Mosinee Paper Corporation [sic) agreed [to do)-
C.J. BURGER: Then you don't need an injunction? 
COUNSEL: That's precisely right. 
C.J. BURGER: It's academic. 
COUNSEL: And the law would be complied with. . . . 
c.J. BURGER: But the question that I'm putting to you is, should not the District 
Court, confronted with an application to enjoin the operation of a dam in which . . . 
$110 million has been invested, exercise the ordinary functions of an equity judge weigh-
ing and balancing the equities? 
COUNSEL: Let me-yes, Your Honor, it seems to me that the Court does have 
equitable discretion-
ute? 
c.J. BURGER: And that includes the equitable discretion not to enforce the stat-
COUNSEL: No, Your Honor, it does not. 
C.J. BURGER: You think it does not. ... 
J. REHNQUIST: I don't agree with you, Mr. Plater. Because you have a long 
history of equitable adjudication where, for instance, a building is built over a lot line, 
and there has been a contest throughout, but the chancellor doesn't reach a decision until 
the building is finally built. And he may say, applying the common law, which has the 
same sanction to him as the legislative laws passed by Congress, I will give you damages, 
I will not give you an injunction. Now why isn't this an appropriate case for that sort of 
an adjudication? 
COUNSEL: Several reasons: number one is, [that here) damages, of course, is not 
a remedy. Once a species is rendered extinct, as Congress said, it is extinct forever. 
Secondly, of course, that would be involving private parties under the common law. 
This Court has repeatedly said that in cases which involve a Congressional statute. . . 
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gress' directive must be obeyed without regard to the utility or public 
interest involved in the defendant's conduct. It is difficult even to im-
agine the Hecht trial court balancing the desirability of price control 
against the value of unfettered marketing practices to the public and to 
the defendant (as Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Hill would seem to ad-
vise). 120 The Hecht Court thus accepted-indeed, based its holding 
on-a restriction of equitable discretion to the limited task of determin-
ing the necessity of various remedies in effectuating congressional rules 
of conduct. 
C Hecht-:r Antecedents 
Although the Supreme Court had not previously addressed a case 
quite like Hecht, the various elements of that decision had been devel-
oped in prior cases. The fact that the Hecht Court cited almost none of 
these cases may have indicated that it regarded its conclusions as self-
evident. 
One fundamental characteristic of the evolving law to that time 
was the recognition that statutes made a difference to the exercise of the 
courts' equitable role. Hecht's recognition that equitable discretion is 
determined by ''the standards of the public interest, not the require-
ments of private litigation"121 followed a long series of statute-based 
cases in the Supreme Court and in lower appellate courts holding that 
injunctions for statutory violations could be issued without traditional 
threshold showings. Equitable remedies issued, for example, despite 
the principle which guides the Court in the exercise of its discretion is enforcing the law, 
which has not been set up by common law but by statute. 
J. REHNQUIST: It's completely opposite in Heck' against Bowles. 
COUNSEL: No, Your Honor; we are not arguing that an injunction must be is-
sued. Under the Heck' case .... 
J. REHNQUIST: That is, if there were voluntary compliance, and an injunction 
wouldn't be necessary. And that was Heck, v. Bowles. 
COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor. The Heck, case said if compliance with Congres-
sional statute would otherwise be achieved, the court of course need not issue an injunc-
tion. We would be pleased if an injunction would not have been necessary in this case 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 51-54, Hill (Apr. 18, 1978). 
The equity argument had been briefed and argued extensively in the court of appeals. In the 
Supreme Court, however, the government decided that it did not want to argue in favor of equita-
ble statutory overrides. Accordingly, the issue was not mentioned in the petitioner's brief. It was 
argued in a long footnote in Respondent's Brief at 45 n.40, and in an amicus brief in favor of 
statutory overrides, Brief by the Pacific Legal Foundation at 5-11. Incidentally, the actual expen-
diture on the dam and associated levees at the time of the Supreme Court hearing was slightly 
more than $20 million. See infra note 300. 
120. Suppose, for example, that the district judge decided that important consumer goods 
would not be available if the price control statute were applied to hold down prices and took on 
the job of exempting such goods from the Act. This would seem to raise serious questions of 
separation of powers as well as questions of practicality. See infra text accompanying notes 305-
19. 
121. 321 U.S. at 331. 
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allegations that the plaintiff government had failed to show irreparable 
injury122 or inadequate remedy at law,123 that the government was not 
doing equity,124 and that the government was otherwise estopped. 125 
Prior cases had also made it clear that statutory declarations of 
public policy would limit the court's equitable discretion with regard to 
substantive rules of conduct. The Supreme Court considered the issue 
in 1937 in the Virginian Railway case. 126 A lower court had decreed 
that the Railway Labor Act127 required the Virginian Railway to nego-
tiate with a union. 128 The company resisted the order on the ground 
that equity traditionally would not compel such action. The Supreme 
Court, after explaining the statutory requirements, held that the com-
pany had to comply: 
The fact that Congress has indicated its purpose to make negotiations 
mandatory is in itself a declaration of public interest and policy which 
should be persuasive in inducing courts to give relief. It is for [such] 
reasons that courts, which traditionally have refused to compel per-
formance of a contract to submit to arbitration, . . . enforce statutes 
commanding performance of arbitration agreements. 129 
There was one case that may have given the Hecht Court pause. 
United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 130 which had been 
strongly argued to the Supreme Court and below in Hecht, \31 seemed 
to declare an absolute deference to Congress in fashioning equitable 
remedies. At issue in San Francisco was a congressional water grant132 
that explicitly prohibited the city from selling any power to a private 
company for resale. The Court determined that the city had violated 
122. Fleming v. Salem Box Co., 38 F. Supp. 997, 998 (D. Or. 1940). 
123. Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 551-52 (1937); SEC v. 
Jones, 85 F.2d 17, 17 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), urI. denied, 299 U.S. 581 (1936). 
124. United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160, 170, 171 (1890) (bill in 
equity not defeated when government refused to reimburse individuals for money paid under 
patents government sought; a hint that government knew of fraudulent coal land sales was also no 
bar to the injunction). 
125. United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16,31,32 (1940) (no estoppel 
despite attorney general's knowing delay in enforcing statute). In most of the cases cited supra in 
notes 122-24, the government was the plaintiff, but the courts' reasoning typically conditioned the 
suspension of traditional equitable balancing on the existence of the statutes rather than on the 
plaintiff's status. An exception is the statement in San Francisco that estoppel (and presumably 
laches) would not be applied to the U.S. Government. 310 U.S. at 32. 
126. Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40,300 U.S. 515 (1937). 
127. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1976). 
128. II F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1935), aff'd, 84 F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1936), aff'd, 300 U.S. 515 
(1937). 
129. 300 U.S. at 552 (citation omitted). 
130. 310 U.S. 16 (1940). 
131. See briefs in Hechl, reprinled in 88 L. Ed. 754-55 (1944). The San Francisco case was 
also heavily relied on in the Alaska pipeline case, Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 847, 
891-93 (D.C. Cir.), urI. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973). 
132. Act of Dec. 19, 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-41, 38 Stat. 242. 
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the federal grants by selling power to the Pacific Gas and Electric Com-
pany. In rejecting a variety of equitable defenses ra1sed by the city, the 
Court declared: "We are satisfied that this case does not call for a bal-
ancing of equities or for the invocation of the generalities of judicial 
maxims .... Congress provided 'that the [defendant] shall at all times 
comply with and observe . . . the conditions specified in this Act 
.•• .' "133 The decision, grounded in the argument that Congress had 
already balanced the equities, would seem to leave no room for the 
balancing that the Hecht Court was later determined to undertake. By 
separating equity into its three functional aspects, however, the appar-
ent conflict between the two cases disappears. 
In San Francisco the city tried to raise threshold equitable de-
fenses; it also sought judicial permission to continue the statutorily pro-
hibited conduct. In other words, the city sought balances in the first 
and second equitable arenas. The Court rejected the city's position, 
holding that Congress had balanced the equities as to both types of 
alleged discretion and that the defendant's conduct accordingly could 
not be permitted to continue. In contrast, Hecht did not require any 
balancing in the first two equitable arenas. Rather, Hecht turned only 
on the final discretionary balance as to choice of remedy, a choice not 
at issue in San Francisco. In both cases the Court required strict com-
pliance with the statute. 
Recognition of the distinction between determinations of future 
conduct and choice of remedy would have saved the Court some em-
barassment in Hecht, for it would have enabled it to distinguish be-
tween the perplexing mass of prior cases variously granting and 
denying injunctions which had been cited to the Court. Each of these 
prior cases, however, was consistent with Hecht. Those not based on 
statute were subject to full equitable discretion. 134 In those involving 
statutes, on the other hand, the courts consistently required compliance 
but differed in issuing injunctions. The latter decision depended-as it 
does in nonstatutory settings--on whether the violations were likely to 
continue unless enjoined. 135 
133. 310 u.s. at 30 (quoting Act of Dec. 19, 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-41, 38 Stat. 242). Here too it 
is clear that the court retained some discretion; it issued an injunction because it found it "both 
appropriate and necessary" to achieve the statutory ends. Id at 31. 
134. See, e.g., Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), cited in Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329; 
Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 182-83 (1935). 
135. In addition to San Francisco, see, e.g., Oregon & Cal. R.R. v. United States, 238 U.S. 393 
(1915) (railroad land grants could be resold to settlers only according to statute; six-month mora-
torium to allow congressional action on timber cutting by railroad, which was not covered by 
statute); United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160 (1890) (illegal purchases of 
federal mineral grants would be enjoined despite equitable threshold and utility arguments); Bus-
caglia v. District Court, 145 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1944) (illegal emergency disbursement of funds 
enjoined where no appropriations act), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 793 (1945); United States v. Killoren, 
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The lone prior case where a party who seemingly violated a stat-
ute had not been held to compliance was United States ex reI. 
Greathouse v. Dern, 136 cited by Justice Rehnquist in support of his Hill 
dissent. 137 There, a citizen brought an action in mandamus-a legal 
writ that turns on equitable principles l38-seeking a permit to build a 
wharf directly in the path of the George Washington Parkway, then 
under construction. The Court understandably thought it futile to 
grant a permit for a structure that would immediately be razed,139 with 
no consequence beyond heightened condemnation damages. It denied 
relief. In examining whether Dern contradicts the principle of 
mandatory enforcement, it is important to note that it was never clear 
whether the defendant had violated any statute in refusing to issue a 
permit. The Court treated the case as one based on general property 
rights rather than on particular statutory rights or violations,140 in effect 
making Dern into a common law case. The legal cause of action was 
accordingly nullified by the well-established principle that a "court in 
its discretion may refuse mandamus to compel the doing of an idle 
act." 141 Thus, Dern is a shallow spring in which to find a source of 
precedent for equitable overrides of substantive statutes. 
D. The Hecht PrinCiples, Post- Hecht 
Despite a tendency in the Hecht opinion, and in equity commen-
tary generally, not to make clear distinctions between the three differ-
ent roles of equitable discretion, the case law since 1944 has been 
remarkably consistent with the principles discerned in Hecht. 
After Hecht, the OPA conformed its procedures to the new strin-
gencies in obtaining injunctions. To implement its policy of dramatic 
deterrence by example, the OPA shifted to more extensive use of treble 
damage suits.142 It still sought injunctions in some cases, and courts 
119 F.2d 364, 366 (8th Cir. 1941) (''The plain mandate of the law cannot be set aside because of 
considerations which may appeal to referee or judge as falling within general principles of equity 
jurisprudence.") (quoting Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Caldwell, 67 F.2d 802, 802 (8th Cir. 
1933), which quotes Burton Coal Co. v. Franklin Coal Co., 67 F.2d 796, 797 (8th Cir. 1933». 
136. 289 U.S. 352 (1933). 
137. 437 U.S. at 213 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
138. 289 U.S. at 359. 
139. Id. at 360. 
140. Neither the language of the 1785 statute securing "full property in the shores of 
Patowmack River" nor the 1899 rivers and harbors appropriations act appears to have created a 
statutory duty on the part of the defendant secretary to issue a permit. The Court noted six areas 
of doubt about the plaintiffs' alleged rights, 289 U.S. at 357-58, which makes its holding, based on 
general equitable discretion, seem far more a traditional balancing of a nonstatutory claim. 
141. Id. at 360. 
142. James interview, supra note 79. Professor James said the OPA attorneys thought that 
treble damage awards, like criminal penalties in price fixing cases, "really got the attention of the 
white collar crowd." Id. 
560 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:524 
sometimes granted them.143 The subsequent decisions tracked Hecht 
and the prior statutory cases in each of the three areas of equitable 
discretion. Threshold questions could be construed far less stringently 
than in common law litigation. l44 Courts uniformly held the adequacy 
or inadequacy of legal remedies irrelevant because of the statutory 
grant of injunctive power,145 but they uniformly required compliance 
with the Price Control Act. 146 And the remedy question-whether in-
junctions would issue in particular cases-turned on whether such or-
ders were necessary to achieve compliance. 
When OPA attorneys sought injunctions, they accepted the need 
for more proof than the mere existence of past violations. Although it 
is not perfectly clear where the burden of equitable persuasion lay-<>n 
the defendant to show why the statutorily authorized injunction should 
not issue, or on the OPA to show why it shouldl47-the elements of the 
equitable decision on choice of remedy followed Hecht. Present cessa-
tion of violations did not constrain the courts' options; they could 
choose to enjoin or not, depending on the likelihood of future compli-
ance. 148 Where past statutory violations had been proved, three ele-
ments consistently reappear in the decisions: whether violations had 
been promptly and effectively discontinued, whether these violations 
had been committed mistakenly in good faith, and whether in the 
court's estimation the defendant's attitude and reputation lent credence 
to promises of future compliance. 149 
Subsequent case law in other areas has demonstrated the same 
consistency with Hecht. There is, of course, a general lack of clarity in 
the courts' analysis of just what it was that Hecht meant. Some courts 
have declaimed generally about the broad powers of equity to imple-
ment discretionary justice; ISO but apart from a few scattered dicta, no 
143 .. See, e.g., Bowles v. Perez Rodrigues, 2 WAR L. SERVo (CCH) ~ 52,184 (D. V.I. 1945). 
144. See, e.g., Bowles V. W.W. Elzea, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (neither OPA's 
alleged unclean hands nor defendant's good faith were bars to public interest enforcement). 
145. Note, supra note 96, at 1026 n.12. 
146. No subsequent OPA cases permitted statutory noncompliance to continue on a balanc-
ing of equities. 
147. The existence of past violations seems to create a judicial predisposition toward the in-
junctive remedy. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n V. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th 
Cir.) ("While past misconduct does not lead necessarily to the conclusion that there is a likelihood 
of future misconduct, it is highly suggestive of future violations."), cerl. denied, 442 U.S. 921 
(1979). 
148. See, e.g., Bowles V. Simon, 145 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1944) (holding that district court 
abused its discretion in denying injunctions where defendant was "uncooperative and hostile" and 
there were "repeated violations" with "flagrant disregard for. . . warnings"). 
149. Note, supra note 96, at 1028. This Note was largely based on the OPA experience, and 
drew on extensive OPA files in the possession of Professors Emerson and James who had worked 
in the OPA Counsel's Office. See supra notes 79, 84. 
ISO. See, e.g., Mills V. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386 (1970). The opinion also 
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court has contended that Congress lacks the power to eliminate all eq-
uitable discretion from cases brought pursuant to statutes. 1S1 Instead, 
the question is whether the power has been explicitly exercised. "Un-
less a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable in-
ference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that 
jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. 'The great principles of 
equity, securing . . . complete justice, should not be yielded to light 
inferences ... .' "152 
When Congress has explicitly altered the traditional practices of 
equity, the courts have confirmed its power to do so. In Yakus v. United 
States,153 a price control case following closely on Hecht's heels, the 
petitioners complained that because Congress had invested the OPA 
with exclusive initial jurisdiction over the question of the constitution-
ality of the Price Control Act, they were denied the remedy of interloc-
utory injunctions against enforcement that would have been available 
in a court. The Supreme Court somewhat disingenuously noted that 
Congress, in statutorily denying interlocutory equitable relief, "has 
only done what a court of equity could have done. . . . The legislative 
formulation of what would otherwise be a rule of judicial discretion is 
not a denial of due process or a usurpation of judicial functions." 154 
The Yakus Court cited a host of other Congressional alterations of 
the equity power in support of this proposition. 155 Congress, however, 
made clear, however, that equity was to provide "such remedies as are necessary to make effective 
the Congressional purpose." Id. 
151. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th Cir.) ("Injunc-
tive relief is never automatic .... "), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979). A concurring opinion by 
Chief Justice Stone in NLRB v. Cheney Cal. Lumber Co., 327 U.S. 385 (1946), which emphasized 
the court's residual power "to frame its own injunction consistently with the record," id. at 390 
(Stone, C.J., concurring), has been interpreted by some commentators as an assertion that legisla-
tive tampering with the basic equity discretion of a court under article III might be held an uncon-
stitutional restriction on judicial power. Note, supra note 96, at 1027 n.l7. It is far from clear, 
however, whether the opinion was asserting so broad a claim. Rather, Chief Justice Stone seems 
to have been echoing the remedy-tailoring discretion secured shortly before in Hecht. 327 U.S. 
390-91 (Stone, C.J., concurring). 
152. Porter v. Warner Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1945). The Court subsequently used a statute, 
again § 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23, 33, to obviate the 
traditional discretionary concern for adequacy onegal remedies. United States v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 328 (1961). 
153. 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
154. Id. at 441-42. The Yakus Court seems to have ignored the petitioner's main point-that 
the agency did not provide readily available interlocutory appeais-and instead focused on the 
petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court recognized that the traditional 
equity jurisdiction had been removed from the district courts by the Act; it deferred to the statuto-
rily created review procedure provided by § 204(d). Id. at 429. Justice Rehnquist missed the 
statutory imperative of Yakus when he cited the case for the general proposition of equitable 
flexibility in his TVA v. Hill dissent, 437 U.S. 153,313 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
ISS. 321 U.S. at 442 n.8. An analogous example in the area of Native American land titles, 25 
U.S.c. § 640d-17(b) (1976), specifically waives laches and the statute of limitations. 
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has generally chosen not to displace the equity jurisdiction. It has 
rarely removed equity's threshold discretion, leaving these initial issues 
to the judgment of equity courts, tempered by the public policies of the 
acts in question. As to the second area of decisionmaking, Congress 
has left the obligation of statutory compliance as an unstated presump-
tion. And, as to choice of remedy, whatever Congress' true intention 
was in the 1942 Price Control Act, no statute passed since then appears 
to have preempted the remedy question by requiring that injunctions 
issue automatically on proof of violations. 156 
1. The Undisturbed Areas of Discretion 
The first and third functional areas of equitable balancing-
threshold questions and the tailoring of remedies-survived the impo-
sition of statutory causes of action relatively undisturbed, once they 
weathered the storm of OPA allegations in Hecht that Congress had 
expressly dictated remedies for price control violations. Before going 
to the second, more controverted, area of discretionary balancing, it is 
worthwhile to note that statutes nevertheless do have an effect in the 
first and third areas as well. 
a. Threshold Balancing 
Statutory declarations of the public interest have continued to af-
fect threshold equitable questions. Especially when a government en-
tity is the plaintiff, courts construe the traditional restraints against 
invoking equity less stringently.157 Although claims based on laches 
and other estoppels may still have some success,158 the other threshold 
issues are rarely subject to equitable balancing. Courts typically ignore 
the existence of purportedly adequate legal remedies where statutes 
have authorized equitable remedies,159 defendants' bad faith is not a 
necessary element,16O and an allegation that a particular statute would 
be violated is a sufficient pleading of irreparable injury. 161 Further-
156. Cf. Labor Management Relations Act, § 206, 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1976), quoted infra at text 
accompanying note 199. 
157. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th Cir.) ("Ac-
tions for statutory injunctions need not meet the requirements for an injunction imposed by tradi-
tional equity jurisprudence. Once a violation is demonstrated, the moving party need show only 
that there is some reasonable likelihood offuture violations."), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979). 
See also United States v. Diapulse Corp., 457 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1972); FTC v. Rhodes Pharmac. 
Co., 191 F.2d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 1951). 
158. See, e.g., United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 653 (1973); Moser 
v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951); Klein v. SEC, 224 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1955). See also Note, 
Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 423 (1981). 
159. Porter v. Warner Co., 328 U.S. 395, 399 (1945). 
160. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1974). 
161. United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir. 1969) (preliminary 
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more, the public policy represented by the statute is a compelling con-
straint even where plaintiffs are nongovernmental. 162 Where citizens 
are acting as private attorneys general, they may be recognized as play-
ing a role which is "a necessary supplement to commission action."163 
A lessening of plaintiff's threshold burdens in statutory cases rep-
resents a relatively uncontroversial form of legislative effect on equita-
ble discretion. The lack of controversy may reflect a line of analysis 
that views these loosened tests as the product of judicial balancing 
rather than congressional fiat (except in a few instances where Congress 
has specifically restricted threshold questions)}64 If the courts them-
selves choose to eclipse traditional concerns in the light of statutory 
definitions of public interest, it remains equity's own balance. The lan-
guage of some cases, however, implies that statutes represent a more 
stringent and direct limitation of the threshold balance. In one early 
case, for example, the Supreme Court declared that "laws ... are op-
erative and obligatory until repealed. This. . . answers all. . . con-
tentions of the railroad company based on waiver, acquiescence and 
estoppel and even to the defenses of laches and the statute of limitation. 
The laws which are urged as giving such defenses . . . have no 
application." 165 
b. Tailoring the Remedies 
In the third arena of equitable balancing-the choice of remedies 
to enforce the determination of future conduct~ourts since 1944 have 
exercised discretion in a manner consistent with Hecht. The courts ex-
ercise discretion, but it is a discretion bounded by ''the duty of giving 
complete and efficacious effect to the prohibition of the statute."166 
injunction case) ("irreparable injury should be presumed from the very fact that the statute has 
been violated"). Accord United States v. Diapu1se Corp., 457 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1972) (''The 
passage of the statute is, in a sense, an implied finding that violations will harm the public and 
ought, if necessary, be restrained."); Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692,698 (2d Cir. 1966); 
Shafer v. United States, 229 F.2d 124, 128 (4th Cir. 1956). 
162. See Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 698 (2d Cir. 1966) (noting the role of 
citizens as recognized in stockholder actions under the Securities Exchange Act and saying that 
"the fact that enforcement is by a private party rather than the agency should not be 
controlling."). 
163. Id 
164. See supra text accompanying notes 121-25. 
165. Oregon & Cal. R.R. v. United States, 238 U.S. 393, 427 (1914). This language focuses on 
the effect of laws, not on the fact that the government is the plaintiff. The presence of a govern-
mental plaintiff changes the balance since laches is generally not thought to apply against the 
government, and estoppel by the acts of officials is disfavored. See, e.g., United States v. San 
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 32 (1940); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389,409 
(1917). Cj United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973) (demonstrating that 
estoppel by official misrepresentation can lie against the government, at least where criminal pen-
alties are involved); accord Klein v. SEC, 224 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1955). 
166. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 185 (1910). See also United 
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Remedies are to be tailored to achieve statutory compliance, not pun-
ishment,167 and "[t]he court ... has a heavy responsibility to tailor the 
remedy to the particular facts of each case so as to best effectuate the 
remedial objectives." 168 As in Hecht, however, this does not mean that 
any remedial order necessarily has to issue. 
In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 169 for example, a corporation 
sought to block voting or further stock acquisitions by a potential take-
over figure, based on the latter's violation of the Williams Act, 170 which 
requires public notice to be given by any person acquiring more than 
five percent of a corporation's outstanding shares. 171 Writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice Burger refused to grant injunctive relief. The 
defendant had made a full, though tardy, public disclosure; the viola-
tion was neither willful nor likely to recur; and no future injury would 
be attributable to the slip. "Thus, the usual basis for injunctive relief, 
'that there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation,' "172 
was not present. Justice Brennan unsuccessfully argued in dissent that 
an injunction should issue automatically because the act was "a pro-
phylactic measure" and that prompt injunctions to order divestiture or 
to bar voting of the stock were necessary to provide deterrence. 173 
In Rondeau the Court-neither desiring nor feeling compelled by 
necessity to issue an injunction-used the less coercive device of a de-
claratory judgment. In many such cases, particularly those involving 
governmental defendants, the remedy of a declaratory judgment is cho-
States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 576 (6th Cir. 1981) ("Courts must carefully tailor the rem-
edy in cases of statutory violations, limiting it to relief necessary to correct the violations.") 
167. Walling v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 159 F.2d 395, 399 (4th Cir. 1946). See also United 
States v. Pent-R-Books, Inc., 538 F.2d 519, 523 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[C)ompliance orders are not puni-
tive, but directory."), cerro denied, 430 U.S. 906 (1977). 
168. Gilbertville Trucking CO. V. United States, 371 U.S. 115, 130 (1965). The phrase "best 
effectuate" raises an interesting side issue. Is the court constrained to issue the best remedy to 
ensure defendants' compliance? A full injunction would always seem to add a bit more to defend-
ants' inclination to comply, even if only marginally. Or is it to select the best remedy to achieve 
compliance consonant with the needs of the surrounding public interest, in which case the ques-
tion of scope of discretion again arises? It may be, for example, that equity will assign a value in 
its balancing to the voluntariness of compliance, reflecting a presumption of residual lawfulness or 
good faith in citizens of the democratic state. In any event, there seems to have been no academic 
or judicial exploration of this question. 
As noted below, the "best effectuate" language does not permit a court to postpone compli-
ance to ease the transition, a remedy which would constitute a judicial override in the short rather 
than long term, but an override nevertheless. See infra notes 264-73 and accompanying text. 
169. 422 U.S. 49 (1975). 
170. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (Supp. IV 1980). 
171. 422 U.S. at 55. 
172. Id at 59. 
173. Id at 65 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Joined by Justice Douglas, Justice Brennan's dissent 
focused on deterrence of future actions because the past violation had been corrected. Justice 
Douglas joined in this opinion notwithstanding his reasoning to the contrary when he rejected 
similar arguments advanced by the OPA in Hecht. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86. 
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sen because the courts presume, or wish to presume, that an injunction 
is not necessary to achieve the defendant's compliance. 174 Such re-
straint may indicate that some judges sitting in equity assign a positive 
normative value to noncoerciveness, where possible, in the tailoring of 
remedies. 17s But even in these cases the courts implicitly or explicitly 
preserve the "plaintiff's right to seek additional relief at a later time 
should it become apparent that the declaratory judgment is not being 
complied with by the defendants."176 
The question of likelihood of future compliance is open to the full 
scope of equitable discretion. Mere cessation of violations does not 
forestall it, nor does good faith or a balancing of harms. 177 The likeli-
hood of compliance is determined by the court's evaluation of the de-
fendant's past willfulness,178 past fraudulent conduct,179 negligence or 
lack of diligence,180 the frequency of past violations,181 and other indi-
cia. 182 Defendant's continued refusal to admit that past actions were 
unlawful tends to show that illegal conduct will continue, while volun-
tary discontinuance prior to official enforcement indicates the 
opposite. 183 
In making compliance the focus of the remedy question, the courts 
have nevertheless blurred an incorporated issue. Is it an abuse of dis-
cretion for a court to issue an injunction without finding that the "ex-
traordinary remedy" is necessary to achieve compliance? Or is there a 
presumption-rebuttable by a clear showing that recurrence is un-
likely-that, where past violations are proven, future violations will be 
enjoined? The cases seem to argue for the rebuttable presumption. 
Though it is not rare for lower courts to be reversed on grounds of 
abuse of discretion for issuing injunctions, this usually occurs where 
174. See, e.g., Poe v. Gerstein, 417 U.S. 281 (1979); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 
157, 165 (1943). 
175. See supra note 168. 
176. Bryant v. Blanton, 463 F. Supp. 155, 157 (W.O. Tenn. 1979). 
177. SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 53 (7th Cir. 1972) ("Respectable 
authority justifies injunctive relief even though infractions are inadvertent and harmless, if they 
are likely to recur."). See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1220 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979). 
178. SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 53 (7th Cir. 1972) (court issued 
injunction where "convinced that the defendants' [past] violations were not inadvertent and 
harmless"). 
179. SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 1963). 
180. SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 964, 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Thus, motive or 
state of mind is not dispositive. Jaeger & Hadley, Equitable Uncertainties in SEC Injunctive Ac-
tions, 24 EMORY L.J. 639, 648 (1975) (citing SEC v. Van Hom, 371 F.2d 181, 186 (7th Cir. 1966». 
181. See SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959). 
182. E.g., Mitchell v. Bland, 241 F.2d 808, 810 n.5 (5th Cir. 1957) (district court relied on the 
defendant's "solemn promise made in open court to one who trusted him"). 
183. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); Jaeger & Hadley, supra note 180, at 652-53. 
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full compliance has already occurred or other evidence of future com-
pliance is present. 184 In other cases district court injunctions are up-
held in spite of evidence that violations are not likely to recur. 185 
The standard of review of trial court decisions on injunctive relief 
is typically, but not exclusively, the abuse of discretion. This deferen-
tial standard reflects an awareness that the trial judge may be in the 
best position to assess the likelihood of future violations. 186 The re-
viewing court may decide that a refusal to enjoin was an abuse of dis-
cretion; if it thinks that the district court misinterpreted the evidence 
upon which discretion was based, it may "find it necessary to refashion 
the remedies."187 But reviewing courts have also reversed denials of 
injunctions on less than a finding of abuse of discretion. "[W]here it is 
clear that its discretion has not been exercised with an eye to the pur-
pose of the Act ... [courts] have nevertheless not hesitated to reverse 
an order of the trial court denying an injunction without the need of a 
discussion of abuse [of] discretion."188 
Despite the deference usually given the trial court, it is often pre-
sumed that if a court finds a statutory violation, an injunction should 
issue. TVA v. Hill189 was such a case. Despite trial court dicta regard-
ing the defendant agency's good faith attempts to comply with the stat-
ute,190 at each judicial level the question of whether agency conduct 
could continue was phrased as a question of whether or not an injunc-
tion would issue. This failure to discuss lesser remedies either pre-
sumed the agency's obduracy or reflected a view of the ordinariness of 
184. See, e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975), discussed supra in text 
accompanying notes 169-73. 
185. In United States v. Pent-R-Books, Inc., 538 F.2d 519,523 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,430 
U.S. 906 (1977), the court observed: 
Appellant would have us read Hecht as standing for the proposition that where the issu-
ance of an injunction would have n<? effect in bringing about better compliance with a 
particular statutory scheme it is an abuse of discretion to issue an injunction. . . . [T]he 
Court's decision in Hecht. . . specifically did not reach the question whether the district 
court's refusal to enter an injunction was an abuse of discretion. It did not decide, or 
even imply, that it might be an abuse of discretion to issue an injunction in the factual 
circumstances of the Hecht case .... There is no suggestion in the statute that ... the 
district court must determine that there is danger of yet a further violation. . . before a 
compliance order may be issued. 
See a/so Gulf King Shrimp Co. v. Wirtz, 407 F.2d 508,516 (5th Cir. 1969). Pent-R-Books, how-
ever, may be attributable to a rough prosecutorial principle that pornographers will be harried as 
much as possible short of violating the first amendment. 
186. Mitchell v. Bland, 241 F.2d 808, 811 (5th Cir. 1957). 
187. SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40,53 (7th Cir. 1972). 
188. United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038, 1044-45 (5th Cir. 1969). See also 
Mitchell v. Ballenger, 299 F.2d 299, 300-01 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 922 (1962). 
189. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
190. The issue of good faith was not litigated by the parties, although the district court as-
serted the defendants' good faith in dismissing the action. 419 F. Supp. 753, 757-58, 763 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1976), rev'tJ, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), aJrd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
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the injunctive remedy. The courts' inclination toward issuing injunc-
tions may also be attributable to judicial recognition of a certain Amer-
ican contumaciousness. In other societies it may be feasible and 
prudent to rely on voluntary obedience to judicial decisions. But to 
presume, for example, that American steelworkers will respond forth-
with to mere judicial declarations that their strike is illegal betrays a 
lack of awareness of cultural reality.191 Given the litigiousness of the 
Yankee race, it is little wonder that injunctions have become a normal 
remedy of choice192 and that the question of whether the conduct is 
illegal often becomes, in effect, the same question as whether an injunc-
tion shall issue. Moreover, as we shall see in Part IV, even in cases 
involving government defendants, the granting of injunctions is, ironi-
cally, often the best way to preserve the sensitive distribution of func-
tions among the separate branches of government. 
2. Statutory Displacement of Equitable Discretion in Defining 
Proscribed Conduct 
In the thirty-eight years since Hecht, the courts have followed, al-
beit without much explicit statement or recognition, the principle that 
equity enforces whatever rules of conduct Congress chooses to define. 
In lzaak Walton League of America v. Butz,193 for instance, the court 
enforced an apparent statutory technicality without hesitation. The 
court's discussion focused almost completely on the question of 
whether the defendant's tree-cutting practices violated several arguably 
obsolete provisions of the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897. 194 After 
interpreting the statute and finding that it was violated, the court 
granted declaratory and injunctive relief with only the briefest citation 
to United States v. City & County of San Francisco. 195 Similarly, several 
labor cases have rejected attempts to justify noncompliance with statu-
tory back pay requirements through judicial balancing of the defendant 
employer's hardships.196 And in a recent case the Supreme Court ob-
191. Even compliance with injunctions is far from sure. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975) (federal defendant); Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (private 
defendants); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1963) (state defendants). 
192. o. FISS, supra note 2, at ch. III. 
193. 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 294-97. 
194. 16 U.S.c. §§ 475-482 (1976). See 522 F.2d at 946-54. 
195. 310 U.S. 16 (1940), cited at 522 F.2d at 955. 
196. See, e.g., McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 709 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) 
(preliminary injunction case), where the court observed: "The court is urgently invited by respon-
dent to 'balance the equities'. Sufficient reason has been indicated already for declining the invita-
tion; the Congress substantially struck the balance when it wrote Section \O(j) [of the National 
Labor Relations Act]." The argument that Congress has already balanced the equities continues 
to be a useful way to define the Hecht distinction, although it does not make clear which equitable 
balance was there involved. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978); House Hearings on Endan-
gered Species: Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on 
568 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:524 
served: "It is true that '[e]quity eschews mechanical rules ... [and] 
depends on flexibility' .... But when Congress invokes the Chancel-
lor's conscience to further transcendent legislative purposes, what is re-
quired is the principled application of standards consistent with those 
purposes and not 'equity [which] varies like the Chancellor's foot.' "197 
Although the Hecht distinctions have not generally been articu-
lated, a series of complex post-Hecht cases has tested the proposition 
offered here that when a statute defines proscribed conduct, courts re-
tain no equitable discretion to override the statutory mandate. 
a. The Steelworkers Case 
The national steel strike of 1959 produced a particularly convo-
luted example of the way the three separate equitable questions become 
intermingled in modem case law. When the strike appeared inevitable, 
President Eisenhower, acting under authority of the 1947 Labor Man-
agement Relations Act,198 asked a district court to enjoin it. The stat-
ute gave the court 'Jurisdiction to enjoin any such strike [for eighty 
days] ... and to make such other orders as may be appropriate" upon 
finding that a strike's continuation will "imperil the national health or 
safety."199 Arthur Goldberg, counsel for the steelworkers union, raised 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 97-98 (1975). For further examples of labor 
cases rejecting attempts to justify noncompliance with statutory backpay requirements, see Franks 
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1974); 
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 296 (1960) (''The statutory purposes 
[leave] little room for the exercise of discretion not to order reimbursement .... "); Wirtz v. 
Malthor, Inc., 391 F.2d I, 3 (9th Cir. 1968) ("It must be remembered that [requiring back pay for 
withheld] minimum wages and overtime compensation is meant to vindicate a public rather than a 
private right, and that the withholding of the money due is considered a continuing public of-
fense. "). For cases refusing on similar grounds to create equitable expansion of the statutory 
exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), 
see Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657,661 (6th Cir. 1972); Soucie v. David, 448 
F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
197. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1974) (brackets in original). See also 
United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 611 (4th Cir. 1974) ("No balancing of interests 
or need to show irreparable injury is required when an injunction is sought under [the statute] to 
prevent erection or seek removal of an unlawful structure. . . ."); Central Presbyterian Church v. 
Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Miss. 1969). 
198. Ch. 120, §§ 201-212, 61 Stat. 136, 152-56 (codified at 29 U.S.c. §§ 171-182 (1976 & Supp. 
III 1979». 
199. Id § 208,61 Stat. at 155 (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 178 (1976». Note that in this 
Act, as in the Price Control Act underlying Hecht and Yakus, the statutory language strongly 
implied that compliance must occur by specifically authorizing injunctive remedies for violations. 
It could perhaps be argued that Hecht, Yakus, and Steelworkers are accordingly idiosyncratic. 
The argument fails, however, in light of the large number of cases that make the Hecht distinction 
in practice, going back at least to United States v. San Francisco, where no such congressional 
declaration of remedies existed. In the text of Hecht, Yakus, and Steelworkers, moreover, the 
Court made no overt linkage between the specification of remedy and the need for compliance, 
instead presuming the latter an independent constant. Hence, the proposition from Hecht appears 
generally applicable. 
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a barrage of arguments against the nationwide injunction which had 
been granted2°O and affirmed on appeal to the Third Circuit.201 He ar-
gued that national health and safety were not imperiled; other injunc-
tive remedies were available to the President; the injunction would 
skew collective bargaining; the union had consistently acted in good 
faith; and major questions of national labor policy were involved that 
should be decided by Congress and its agencies, not by the courts. He 
further argued that if an injunction were to issue, it should not be a 
blanket industrywide injunction, but rather an injunction tailored to 
demonstrated national injuries.202 
Part of the murkiness of the Steelworkers case lies in a general 
uncertainty about what conduct the statute prohibited. Moreover, by 
the statute's terms, it was the court, not the executive or legislative 
branches, that was to declare the relevant standards of conduct203 in 
each case, apply them to the facts, and require enforcement if neces-
sary. The Supreme Court issued a vague four page per curiam opinion 
finding a peril to national safety based upon steel consumption in de-
fense programs, rejecting the threshold arguments,204 asserting the con-
stitutional propriety of delegating such questions to courts as a sort of 
innovative public nuisance action,20S and affirming the grant of a na-
tionwide injunction.206 These issues were debated at far greater length 
in a dissent written by Justice Douglas, who had written for the major-
ity in Hecht, and in a long concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter, 
whose enigmatic concurring opinion in Hecht had emphasized equita-
ble discretion. 
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, filed a month after the 
majority and dissenting opinions,207 had a difficult time explaining 
what the short majority decision had meant. First, Justice Frankfurter 
asserted that the district court had broad discretionary authority to de-
fine what acts imperiled national health or safety.208 He argued, in 
other words, that the statute gave the courts a free hand in defining 
200. 178 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Pa. 1959). 
201. 271 F.ld 676 (3d Cir. 1959). 
202. United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 41-43 (1959). 
203. Id at 40. 
204. The Court noted that "Congress was not concerned with the merits of the parties' posi-
tions or the conduct of their negotiations," Id at 41, and continuccl, ''We do not believe that 
Congress in passing the statute intended that the issuance of injunctions should depend upon 
judicial inquiries of this nature." Id 
205. The court recognized that, even if the statute did not set up any rule of conduct for 
employers or labor, it nevertheless set up "certain rights in the public" that were litigable at the 
instance of the Government. Id at 43. 
206. Id at 44. 
207. Id at 44 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
208. Id at 47-48. 
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what conduct constituted a statutory violation (part of the second equi-
table inquiry). Then he had to argue that once the courts had deter-
mined that a violation existed, they had no discretionary authority but 
to issue a blanket eighty-day injunction.209 Frankfurter implied that 
Congress had permitted-indeed required-discretion in the difficult 
area of defining conduct but had sharply circumscribed discretion re-
garding the usually less significant issue of choice of remedy. Frank-
furter attempted to show why a court exercising its remedy-tailoring 
discretion might well have to issue a blanket injunction. "The steel 
industry is too vast and too complicated to be segmented," in marked 
contrast to the situation in Hecht, where it was relatively simple to fine-
tune a remedy.210 
Justice Frankfurter's major argument rested on the statutory dis-
placement of equitable discretion. He read the grant of "jurisdiction to 
enjoin. . . and to make such other orders" as significantly stricter than 
Hecht's jurisdiction to issue an injunction "or other order,"211 and con-
cluded that the issuance of injunctions was mandatory.212 Frankfurter, 
who had seemed to imply the primacy of equitable discretion in Hecht, 
now asserted statutory primacy over equity, whether or not the basis 
upon which Congress and President acted "were ill-founded ... inval-
idated by experience ... [or] found wanting by hindsight."213 
Justice Douglas' main argument in dissent was that, as in Hecht, a 
grant of jurisdiction to issue injunctions did not mandate their issuance 
if circumstances permitted enforcement through lesser orders. He ar-
gued that the district court should have been instructed on remand to 
exercise its discretion to make particularized findings, which would en-
able it to fashion only as limited an injunction as necessary to effectuate 
the statute.214 Congress did not, and would not have wanted to, require 
broad injunctions. "We should hesitate long before we conclude that 
Congress intended an injunction to issue against 500,000 workers 
209. /d at 55-56. 
210. /d at 49 (quoting the court of appeals). 
211. /d at 59 (emphasis added). 
212. /d at 56 ("[U)nder the national emergency provisions of the Labor Management Rela-
tion Act it is not for judges to exercise conventional 'discretion' to withhold an 'eighty-day' injunc-
tion upon a balancing of conveniences."). It is interesting to note that Justice Frankfurter spoke of 
balancing the conveniences as to the question of remedy, while the question of conduct abatement 
to which the balance is usually applied had already been determined in his analysis. In his discus-
sion of the need for a blanket injunction, he thus may have been implicitly incorporating the 
question of whether striking by the "noncritical" steelworkers violated the statute and wanted to 
reaffirm that the violation was indeed as broad as the entire industry. 
213. /d at 58. Justice Frankfurter cautioned: "These are not matters within the Court's 
concern. . . . They certainly do not warrant the Judiciary's intrusion into the exercise by Con-
gress and the President of their respective powers and responsibilities. . . . Such congressional 
power is not to be subordinated to a sterile juristic dialectic." /d at 62. 
214. /d at 69-70 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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where the inactivity of only 5000 or 10,000 of the total imperils the 
national 'safety,''' he argued. "That would be too sharp a break with 
traditional equity practice for us to accept, unless the statutory mandate 
were clear and unambiguous.,,21s 
For whatever reason-perhaps because it was a "great case ... 
charged with importance and feeling"216-Justice Frankfurter had de-
livered a dramatic declaration of legislative supremacy over equitable 
balancing, and it has been so used by subsequent courtS.217 But viewed 
analytically, it is not perfectly clear what his separate opinion was at-
tempting. It superimposed a severely restricted remedy discretion (it-
self derived from a rather weak statutory interpretation) upon a broad-
based judicial discretion in the determination of violations. It uncriti-
cally equated the congressional command that critical strike activity be 
abated with a requirement that a blanket injunction issue. It skipped 
lightly past the traditional equitable principle of tailoring remedies by 
construing the term "enjoin" to include only the strongest form of 
broad prohibitory injunction, rather than the myriad variations 
available.218 
Even though the Steelworkers case was rife with anomalies, each 
opinion clearly showed a presumptive acceptance of statutory limits on 
equitable discretion. And as to the question of who--court or Con-
gress-determines future conduct in statutory litigation, each opinion 
either implicitly219 or explicitly presumed that a congressional direc-
tive, whatever it may be, has to be enforced by the courts. 
b. The Reserve Mining Litigation 
Of all the post-Hecht cases, one case of almost unprecedented 
complexity and duration offers the stiffest challenge to the proposition 
that statutes limit the court's equitable discretion to determine future 
conduct. The focus of the Reserve Mining220 litigation was a Minnesota 
215. Id at 71-72. See also id at 71 ("!fthe federal court is to be merely an automaton stamp-
ing the papers an Attorney General presents, the judicial function rises to no higher level than an 
IBM machine. Those who grew up with equity and know its great history should never tolerate 
that mechanical conception."). 
216. Id at 62. 
217. E.g., Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 108 (1970) (Harlan, 
J., concurring); Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 661 (6th Cir. 1972); United 
States v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272, 291 (W.O. La. 1963). 
218. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. 
219. The Douglas dissent was based on the premise that the statute was not violated at all, or 
if so, by only a small segment of the labor force, requiring only a narrowly delimited injunction. 
220. An entire legal process course could be taught out of the Reserve Mining case, which 
involved federal and state statutory and common law; federal, state, and private plaintiffs against 
corporate defendants and their labor and municipal supporters; with carcinogenic pollutants and 
the es~etics of a pristine Great Lake; air and water pollution; convoluted industrial economics 
and much chemistry and technology; nine trips to the federal district court (one hearing lasting 
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iron ore mill that was daily dumping 67,000 tons of taconite sludge into 
Lake Superior. The case did not completely deny enforcement to the 
statutes involved. It did, however, permit the defendant to continue the 
statutory violations for a "reasonable time" potentially ranging from 
three to seven or even ten years while abatement plans were imple-
mented.221 The Reserve Mining court permitted the violations to con-
tinue after a classic balancing of overall equities, weighing the violation 
and health hazards against the difficulty and cost of compliance and the 
economic prosperity of the local community.222 
Upon careful analysis of the byzantine proceedings, however, Re-
serve Mining does not stand for the proposition of judicial overrides. 
The district court originally ordered the mill shut down in April 1974 
based on violations of federal and state common law nuisance, the state 
air act, and the 1970 Federal Water Pollution Control Act.223 Signifi-
cantly, each of these grounds implicitly or explicitly permitted the court 
to balance the question of abatement. The federal Act, for instance, 
said: "The court, giving due consideration to the practicability and to 
the physical and economic feasibility of securing abatement of any pol-
lution proved, shall have jurisdiction to enter such judgment, and order 
enforcing such judgment, as the public interest and the equities of the 
case may require."224 Accordingly, the district judge appropriately em-
nine months), two to the state courts, four to the Eighth Circuit, one to the Supreme Court in an 
unsuccessful petition to revoke a stay; injunctions, stays, modified injunctions, mandamus orders 
(also stayed, and reinstated); an elaborate permit and standard-setting administrative system; 
counterclaims by industry for tort damages owing to "negligently issued permits"; a federal statute 
which, after 60 years of dormancy, suddenly imposed new prohibitions through a twist of statu-
tory interpretation; plus an appellate order forcing the district judge to recuse himself for bias 
formed in the course of trial. Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 434 F. 
Supp. 1191 (D. Minn. 1976); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 417 F. Supp. 791 (D. Minn. 
1976); 417 F. Supp. 789 (D. Minn.), ajf'd, 543 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976); 412 F. Supp. 705 (D. 
Minn. 1976); 408 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Minn. 1976); 394 F. Supp. 233 (D. Minn. 1974), modified sub 
nom. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), modified en banc sub nom. Reserve 
Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976) (recusal order); 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn.), 
stayed, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir.), motion to vacate stay denied, 418 U.S. 911, motion to vacate or 
modify stay denied, 419 U.S. 802 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Reserve Mining Co. v. 
Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1977); Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollution Control 
Agency, 294 Minn. 300, 200 N.W.2d 142 (1972); see N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1982, at 31, col. I. 
221. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492,538,541 n.1. See infra text accompanying 
notes 264-73. The discharges into Lake Superior continued under the injunctive compliance 
schedule until 1980, when the company shifted to on-land disposal at Milepost 7. Interview with 
Robert Herbst, former Commissioner of Conservation for Minnesota (Dec. 23, 1981). 
222. 514 F.2d at 506, 515, 520-21, 535-39. 
223. 380 F. Supp. at 23-26. 
224. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, ch. 758, § 2(d)(7), 62 Stat. 1155, 1157 (cur-
rent version at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976». The definition of a violation of standards was subject to 
the same open-ended discretion, Act of Oct. 2, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 5(c)(5), 79 Stat. 903, 
909 (1965) (amended 1972), in a legislative formulation of enforcement mechanisms successfully 
designed by its drafters to be unenforceable. Cf. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971), 
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3668, 3672 (discussing lack of enforcement). 
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barked on a voluminous discussion of competing equities without any 
discussion of mandatory abatement.225 
Six months later, the trial judge added a further finding that the 
Refuse Act, a statute which cast the abatement question in nondiscre-
tionary terms, had also been violated;226 but since there was already an 
abatement injunction outstanding, the court issued no additional in-
junction,227 Accordingly, it was the original injunction that the court of 
appeals reviewed and modified.228 Although the existence of the Re-
fuse Act violations should have changed the nature of the debate over 
abatement, no one seems to have recognized the point. This may be 
attributable to the fact that the court subsumed that statutory violation 
in its own extensive discussion of health hazards which required abate-
ment with deliberate speed.229 The Refuse Act-the only statute pos-
ing a direct statutory prohibition-was not mentioned in the court of 
appeals' remedies discussion.230 In fact, when the plaintiffs brought the 
case to the Supreme Court on interlocutory appeal, the Act was not 
even cited in Justice Douglas' extensive dissenting opinion in favor of 
an immediate injunction.231 On remand, all discussions continued to 
focus on the balancing of health hazards, and the Refuse Act violation 
was never again mentioned with regard to the need for abatement, fall-
ing out of sight between the procedural cracks.232 
On this meandering record it is difficult to discern a clear statutory 
violation or judicial recognition of a Hecht question, much less a hold-
ing or reasoning in support of equitable overrides of statutory provi-
sions. On its own terms and despite its appearances, Reserve Mining is 
essentially based upon common law standards233 rather than legislative 
The Minnesota statute, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1168.03 (West 1977), incorporated similar internal 
ftexibility, as did, of course, the common law actions. 
225. 380 F. Supp. at 29-57. 
226. Rivers and Harbor Appropriations Act of 1899, § 13,33 U.S.c. § 407 (1976) (forbidding 
the placement of any "refuse" in navigable waters without a Corps of Engineers permit). 
227. 394 F. Supp. at 245. 
228. 514 F.2d at 535-40. 
229. The company possessed a 1960 Refuse Act permit authorizing Reserve "to construct a 
sheet pile dock ... and, to deposit tailings from the ore processing mill inltol Lake Superior." Id. 
at 530. The court said that the permit "does not sanction a continuing discharge of foreign materi-
als into the lake which are potentially hazardous to health," id. at 532 n.76, but then proceeded to 
weigh the question in terms of the extent to which these were indeed hazards to public health, id. 
at 535-38. 
230. Id. at 531, 536-39. 
231. 419 U.S. at 802-04. 
232. See United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 408 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Minn. 1976). 
233. Including the codified "common law" balancing of the particular pollution statutes there 
involved. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. The court of appeals did cite United States 
v. City & County of San Francisco, 23 F. Supp. 40, 53 (N.D. Cal. 1938), rev'd, 106 F.2d 569 (9th 
Cir. 19~9), rev'd, 310 U.S. 16 (1940), which does not support a proposition of statutory overrides 
by equity; to the contrary, it required statutory compliance, (albeit with a six-month grace period, 
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mandates. 
c. National Environmental Policy Act Cases 
Some of the last decade's National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEP A)234 cases present a further opportunity to test the equity analy-
sis presented here. Indeed, recurring examples of denials of equitable 
relief in NEP A cases prompted one commentator to issue a broad 
pronouncement: 
Courts thus usually balance the equities before issuing an injunction or 
an order of compliance for violation of environmental statutes. This 
balancing process is very similar to that which has developed for pri-
vate nuisance. The court figures the efficiency calculus, adjusting the 
calculation by weighting or presumptions derived from the relevant so-
cial values.235 
This asserts precisely the proposition that Hecht did not make and that 
this present analysis has been trying to refute-a judicial balancing in 
statutory cases, not only at the uncontroversial threshold and remedy 
stages, but in the central question of determining conduct as welL Pro-
fessor Winner rested his argument exclusively on NEP A cases,236 but 
even there it is difficult to sustain. 
In virtually every case, NEPA lawsuits seek injunctions on the the-
ory that a federal project or program either does not have an environ-
mental impact statement as required by section 102(2)(C) for all "major 
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment," or that the statement which has been prepared is inade-
quate.237 Given the vast number of federal actions potentially subject 
to NEPA requirements and the recalcitrance of many agencies, it is not 
surprising that many violations do occur. And given the fact that envi-
ronmentallawsuits seek to impose new standards of planning and de-
sign and newly declared public values on public and private 
decisionmaking, it is not surprising that they raise a host of competing 
equities. 
see infra note 264) and remands to the legislature where a law was "unworkable." 514 F.2d at 
537-38. In the same regard, it cited Chief Justice Burger's general caveat on reasonableness in 
environmental enforcement, Abderdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. SCRAP, 409 U.S. 1207, 1217, 1218 
(Burger, Circuit Justice 1972), which nevertheless on statutory grounds had denied a stay of the 
injunction. If Reserve Mining were to represent a conscious holding that courts can override stat-
utes, of course, there is the further possibility that it was wrongly decided. 
234. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4369 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
235. Winner, supra note 35, at 506. 
236. Beyond the terms of his environmental proposition, Professor Winner also cited Hecht, 
Steelworkers, San Francisco, J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), and two state cases. 
Winner, supra note 35, at 506-08. In none of these did a court override the prohibitions of 
statutes. 
237. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). 
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As Winner notes, denials ofNEPA injunctions are frequent. 238 As 
is often the case when injunctions are denied, however, in many of 
these cases the courts found that NEPA did not apply to the acts in 
question,239 or that compliance would occur even without an injunc-
tion.240 Other cases cited by Winner for the equitable balancing propo-
sition were preliminary injunction actions (in which compliance was 
nevertheless often required where clear violations existed),241 or cases 
where procedural compliance had already substantially occurred.242 It 
does not appear that any lower court, much less the Supreme Court, 
has ever found in a proceeding on the merits that federal actions violat-
ing NEPA could continue in opposition to the statutory mandates. 
238. Most commentators and courts now concede that NEPA is a procedural statute, provid-
ing for a series of administrative reviews and disclosures, but not directing any particular substan-
tive decisions. Thus, in cases where a project is too far along to be affected by the comprehensive 
environmental analysis provided in NEPA, the Act does not apply and no injunction will issue 
since there is no violation. See, e.g., San Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 472 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 
1973); Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
1000 (1972); Pennsylvania Envtl. Council v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971); East 63rd SI. 
Assoc. v. Coleman, 414 F. Supp. 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In Conservation Soc'y of S. VI., Inc. V. 
Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927, 936-37 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), the chal-
lenged intersection was virtually complete; thus, although the court discussed balancing, it appears 
that NEPA had no possible effect on the intersection and thus was inapplicable. The Supreme 
Court has noted that "NEPA essentially imposes a procedural requirement on agencies," so that 
NEP A case law is "completely inapposite" to cases arising under statutes imposing a substantive 
standard. TVA V. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 n.34 (1978). 
239. Environmental Defense Fund V. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1174-75 (6th Cir. 1972) (the Hill 
Tellico Dam case in a prior incarnation); Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 1971); 
Sierra Club V. Coleman, 405 F. Supp. 53, 54-55 (D.D.C. 1975); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. V. Cal-
laway, 382 F. Supp. 610, 623 (D. D.C. 1974). 
240. In Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 485-86 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part sub nom. Western 
Gas & Oil Ass'n v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978), the inadequacy of the environmental impact 
statement was a failure to consider adequately the possibilities of adding termination clauses or 
stronger operating rules to offshore oil leases. The court remanded to the Secretary of Interior for 
consideration of these alternatives in subsequent NEPA review and for implementation if they 
appeared necessary. In Environmental Defense Fund V. Armstrong, 352 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal. 
1972), the court did not issue an injunction, but rather ordered the government to comply with a 
revised project schedule to assure that no actual work or environmental damage would occur prior 
to further court hearing. In the subsequent hearing, the court found the revised environmental 
impact statement to be adequate. 356 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Cal.), affd, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973). 
These cases ignore the reality of the bureaucratic momentum inherent in continuation of an 
agency's project planning and contracting, but reflect the view that NEPA only prevents actual 
damage. Hence on their own terms the courts were not permitting statutory violations to continue. 
241. In New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 550 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1977), the court did 
not clearly hold that there was a violation. In Sierra Club V. Coleman, 405 F. Supp. 53, 54-55 
(D.D.C. 1975), the preliminary injunction was issued on proof of violation. In Realty Income 
Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447, 455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the court denied the preliminary relief 
because the draft and final environmental impact statements, though absent when construction 
plans had first been presented, "have long since been completed and released." 
242. 564 F.2d at 455-56. In Essex County Preservation Ass'n v. Campbell, 536 F.2d 956 (1st 
Cir. 1976), a preliminary injunction was denied on the ground that although a technical statutory 
violation had occurred through failure to get a state highway action plan approved prior to federal 
funding, the defect had subsequently been remedied. 
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d Romero-Barcelo v. Weinberger 
Only recently, the Supreme Court was asked again to define an 
equitable power to override statutory provisions in the case of Romero-
Barcelo v. Weinherger.243 The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico had been 
embroiled in a longrunning dispute with the Navy over the issue of the 
island of Vieques as a bombing target. In.an apparent attempt to im-
prove his position for negotiating protections for the residents of the 
island, Governor Romero-Barcelo filed a lawsuit that eventually com-
prised some two dozen claims based on treaties and executive orders, 
constitutional and common law rights, and a variety of environmental 
and pollution statutes.244 The district court ultimately found violations 
of the federal Clean Water Act (which expressly includes munitions as 
one of many classes of pollutants requiring a federal permit),245 the 
National Historic Preservation Act's Executive Order No. 11,593,246 
and NEPA.247 But then, in a classic exercise of unfettered balancing, 
the district court refused to order abatement of the bombing and in-
stead ordered the Navy to proceed with the permit procedure "with all 
deliberate speed."248 
The district court asserted that there was no difference in judicial 
balancing power between statutory and nonstatutory cases.249 It noted 
that injunctions are "an extraordinary remedy," citing the classic lan-
guage of broad, historic equitable discretion from Hecht and Rondeau 
v. Mosinee Paper CO. 250 As is so commonly done, however, the court 
failed to make the fundamental distinction, embodied in the holdings 
of both those Supreme Court cases, between the choice of remedy (no 
injunction was necessary in either case), and the abatement decision 
itself (immediate compliance was req.uired in both). The court then set 
forth to balance the equities, noting that an injunction would affect na-
tional defense, that the violations were "in substance technical viola-
tions," that the plaintiffs' requests were "drastic" and colored by laches, 
243. 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981), aJig in part and vacating in part Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. 
Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct. 88 
(1981) (No. 80-1990). 
[Editor'S Note: Romero-Barcelo was reversed, Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 50 U.S.L.W. 4434 
(U.S. Apr. 27, 1982), late in the publication process. See Author's Postscript infra notes 320-28 
and accompanying text.] 
244. 478 F. Supp. at 651-52. 
245. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1976). 
246. 3 C.F.R. 559 (1971), reprinted in 16 U.S.C. § 470 app. (1976). 
247. See 478 F. Supp. at 664, 694, 705. 
248. Id at 708 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (Brown II». Each viola-
tion was susceptible to procedural correction. 
249. Id at 706 (citing six NEPA cases and comparing statutory to constitutional cases). 
250. 422 U.S. 49 (1975), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 169-73. 
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and that plaintiffs would suffer no great harm by delay.25I 
On appeal the First Circuit held that this classic balancing exercise 
was improper. Focusing on the Clean Water Act violation, the court 
ordered issuance of an injunction halting the bombing,252 Reasoning 
that "Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order 
of priorities in a certain area," so that the Navy "has an absolute statu-
tory obligation to stop any discharges ... [until the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA)] has granted a permit,"253 the court of ap-
peals reversed the district court's exercise of a power to balance the 
equities. 
The First Circuit's opinion also noted the existence of a statutory 
procedure by which the President could exempt the Navy from the 
Clean Water Act permit requirement in the interest of national security 
if the Act significantly interfered with the Navy's preparedness.254 In 
fact, the statute provides three different administrative exemptions 
which the Navy could have requested: two from the President (individ-
ual exemptions or a broader category waiver by rulemaking) and one 
from the EPA. 255 
Instead of applying for the statutorily prescribed waivers, the 
Navy sought to obtain statutory flexibility from the courts. In its peti-
tion to the Supreme Court, the Navy argued that if the Office of the 
President were obliged to issue individual exemptions or category 
waiver rules, 
[The Executive] will in effect be formulating an equitable decree to sat-
isfy the purposes and policies of the Clean Water Act. It is the role of 
the courts to fashion appropriate equitable relief for violations of fed-
erallaw. The federal courts should not abdicate that responsibility and 
251. 478 F. Supp. at 706-07. 
252. 643 F.2d at 862. 
253. Id. at 861 (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978». The court made a careful 
distinction with regard to Executive Order 11593 and NEPA violations, for which it said compli-
ance had been achieved without the need for the injunctive remedy. Id. at 862. It made the same 
disposition of an endangered species claim in which it found merit. Id. at 858, 863. 
254. Id. at 862 (citing 33 U.S.c. § 1323(a) (Supp. III 1979». 
255. The executive waiver provisions provide: 
The President may exempt any effluent source ... from compliance with any such a 
requirement ifhe determines it to be in the paramount interest ofthe United States to do 
so ... , for a [renewable) period not in excess of one year .... In addition ... the 
President may ... issue regulations exempting ... any weaponry, equipment, aircraft, 
vessels, vehicles, or other classes or categories of property. . . which are owned or oper-
ated by the Armed Forces of the United States and which are uniquely military .... 
33 U.S.c. § 1323(a) (Supp. III 1979) (the rulemaking waivers must be reviewed every three years). 
According to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(5)(A), (B) (Supp. III 1979), the Environmental Protection 
Agency can extend final deadlines for "a time the Administrator determines to be reasonable" and 
could have granted extended delays pending permit issuance, prior to April 1979. The Navy 
argued that the individual exemption provision was "evidently intended to provide for relief only 
in extraordinary circumstances, when the requirements of the Act are inconsistent with essential 
federal activities." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14-15, Romero-Barcelo. 
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shift it to the Office of the President in the absence of a clear congres-
sional direction to do SO.256 
This argument was supported by citations to Reserve Mining and sev-
eral other lower court cases where injunctions were not issued.257 The 
Navy also relied heavily on Hecht, stressing its language about equity's 
flexibility in tailoring remedies "appropriate" to enforce a statute.258 
Nowhere did it mention Hecht's distinction between the judicial tailor-
ing of remedies and the lack of choice in requiring abatement of 
violations. 
The Navy's most ambitious undertaking in Romero-Barcelo was to 
posit a new definition of equitable discretion to circumscribe the 
Supreme Court's recent opinion in TVA v. Hill. 259 Equity presump-
tively has the power to override statutes, the Navy argued, unless there 
are "special circumstances ... not present here." The special circum-
stances occur only when two conditions are present: first, when "Con-
gress 'has decided the order of priorities' and has made it 'abundantly 
clear that the balance has been struck in favor of [compliance] 
. . . .' "260 and, second, when "the violation . . . was substantial 
.. ."261 and "directly and fundamentally in conflict with the purposes 
of the Act."262 
The Navy's innovative test inevitably would necessitate extensive 
256. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Romero-Barcelo. This argument appears to be 
focused on the first, quasi-adjudicative waiver, and does not appear to take account of the exist-
ence of the rulemaking waiver discussed supra at note 255. 
257. Id at 5,8 n.7. United States v. Kennebec Log Driving Co., 491 F.2d 562 (1st Cir. 1973), 
was a case in which the court found there was no violation of § 15 of the River and Harbors Act, 
33 U.S.c. § 409 (1976), owing to a statutory exception for logdriving. Id § 410. It remanded on 
the question of whether the consequent incidental deposits of bark and chips were proscribed by 
§ 13 of the Refuse Act, id § 407, and briefly discussed whether, if these deposits were not exempt 
from the Refuse Act, the district court could consider estoppel reliance arguments and economic 
and practical burdens as a basis for declining to require compliance. 491 F.2d at 570-71. The 
court implied that such a balance could be made. Id In United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 500 
F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1974), the question was how much chemical discharge was permissible without 
a Refuse Act permit, pending issuance of a general FWPCA-NPDES permit. The court affirmed 
an injunction partially restricting discharges, owing to the "highly technical" nature of the ques-
tion, pending issuance of the new permit. No party apparently ever requested a total injunction, 
and so the court never recognized or discussed the question whether it could permit a partial 
override of the old statute. See id at 175. In these circumstances, neither case justifies the asser-
tion that equity can override legislation. 
258. Brief for Petitioners at 10, II, 17, 18, Romero-Barcelo. The petitioners also cited the 
general injunctive discretion section of 7 J. MOORE, supra note 2, ~ 65.18[3], which deals with 
injunctive balancing. On the statutory question the brief merely noted without analysis that some 
cases like San Francisco evince "little or no discretion" and thus do not follow Hecht's broad 
panegyric on equitable discretion. Brief for Petitioners at 18, Romero-Barcelo. 
259. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
260. Brief for Petitioners at 12, Romero-Barcelo. 
261. Petition for Certiorari at 7, Romero-Barcelo. 
262. Brief for Petitioners at 13, Romero-Barcelo. 
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judicial second-guessing of the legislature, far beyond the relatively 
clear-cut statutory interpretation involved in determining the existence 
of a violation. The first element implies a rebuttable presumption that 
statutes do not necessarily represent a considered congressional choice 
of permitted or proscribed conduct. The second element implies that 
courts are to be guided by "the purposes of the Act" not only in defin-
ing the basic statutory requirements, but also in some ad hoc judicial 
ranking of violations in terms of substantiality or insubstantiality, di-
rectness or indirectness, fundamentality or nonfundamentality. These 
questions are normally thought of as political in nature, so such a rank-
ing would be as political as it is difficult.263 The Navy's argument 
asked the Court to embark on uncharted waters, redefining both the 
occasion and scope of judicial discretion in overriding statutes. This is 
a longstanding invitation that courts have long declined to accept. 
e. lJiscretion to Postpone Compliance 
The use of delayed injunctions presents another version of judicial 
overrides of statutes. When the Reserve Mining court, for example, 
used a balancing of the equities to permit defendants to postpone com-
pliance for a "reasonable time," it effectively created a three to ten year 
statutory override.264 The application of a reasonableness balance to 
the timing of equitable remedies would have been completely appropri-
ate, of course, had the case been a traditional nonstatutory case. Even 
as it was, since the court based its decision on statutes which allowed 
judicial balancing, flexibility appeared to have been appropriate in that 
statutory setting as well.265 Where the statute being violated does not 
provide for such judicial balancing, however, does equity have a 
263. In navigating this tricky course for the Navy, the Solicitor General's office had to argue 
that the endangered species violation in Hill had been a substantial violation of a congressionally 
ordered priority, a position diametrically opposed to the position they had taken in Hill. Section 7 
of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976) (current version at Supp. III 1979), was 
written with much circumlocution and obfuscation, so it hardly seems to represent a particularized 
choice of priorities. Justice Powell was probably correct when he argued in Hill that Congress, in 
passing the Endangered Species Act, had not foreseen its utility in lawsuits to halt federal projects. 
437 U.S. at 208-09 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
264. See supra text accompanying note 22. Another example is San Francisco, discussed 
supra in text accompanying notes 130-35, where the trial court had originally delayed the effect of 
the injunction until six months after its issuance "[i]n order that the city may face its problem and 
comply with its [statutory] obligations." 23 F. Supp. 40, 53 (N.D. Cal. 1938), rev'd, 106 F.2d 569 
(9th Cir. 1939), afid, 310 U.S. 16 (1940). In Romero-Barcelo, the Navy's Reply Brief argued that 
"[t]he sole question presented in this case is whether the federal courts retain the discretion to 
formulate [a delayed compliance] remedy without ordering immediate cessation of the violating 
discharges .... " Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1-3, Romero-Barcelo. The appears to be a major 
diminution of the arguments previously made by the petitioners, discussed supra in text accompa-
nying notes 256-62. 
265. See supra text accompanying notes 223-24. The court failed to realize that the Refuse 
Act violation made a difference. Id 
~--~-----------
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residual power to grant defendants a reasonable transition time to 
move from noncompliance to compliance? 
The argument for equitable postponements is initially compelling. 
A reasonable amount of time for the transition to compliance would 
appear to be a matter of common sense. The "common sense" asser-
tion, however, raises questions of its own, and the "reasonable post-
ponement" of decrees has the potential of completely undercutting the 
lines drawn in the cases to date. 
Any judicial authorization of noncompliance-whether for an in-
definite long term or for a circumscribed short term-analytically re-
quires recognition of a judicial power to override the mandates of a 
statute. Once asserted, such a power would become the arena for fur-
ther troublesome questions. How long can the courts postpone compli-
ance? Is defendant's prior good faith a prerequisite? Must the court's 
postponement be motivated solely by the public cost of immediate 
compliance, or are private burdens to the defendant sufficient? Is a 
financial interest enough, or must health and safety issues be involved? 
The preferable answer, which is, moreover, consistent with the 
logic of equity and statutes and theories of separation of powers, is that 
a court must order defendants to comply with violated statutes as im-
mediately as feasible. In many circumstances this will mean immediate 
cessation of the violative conduct.266 In other cases, the courts properly 
may take account of the infeasibility of immediate compliance. As-
sume that the case arises in which immediate compliance is physically 
impossible, where, for example, a court has determined under a water 
pollution statute that all dam operators must immediately obtain per-
mits if they are to continue discharging water downstream.267 There is 
a simple answer to the apparent dilemma between the statutory re-
quirement and the realities of the situation. The answer lies in the 
principle that the courts cannot require the doing of an impossibility: 
Equity will not decree a vain thing.268 An injunction ordering immedi-
ate cessation would be useless; if issued and disobeyed, it would not be 
punished under the contempt sanction.269 On the other hand, an order 
266. In Romero-Barcelo, for example, it would appear feasible for the Navy to cease its 
bombing ofVieques immediately, at the same hour requesting the President to issue an immediate 
waiver under his statutory power. It could conceivably resume bombing under a waiver that same 
afternoon. The Navy recognized this option but preferred a court-authorized delay in compli-
ance, pending the completion of various permit procedures. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 2 n.2, 
Romero-Barcelo ("[AJn immediate cessation order would require the Navy to obtain a presiden-
tial exemption from the statute, despite its readiness to seek a permit and thereby bring itself into 
compliance with the statutory requirements."). 
267. This is the not-so-hypothetical case noted supra note 28. 
268. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
269. The contempt power is a clearly discretionary power of a court sitting in equity to punish 
"such contempt of its authority ... as ... [dJisobedience or resistance to its lawful writ." 18 
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requiring defendants to comply with the statute as soon as physically 
feasible would neither order the doing of the impossible, nor by its 
terms authorize the violation of a statute,270 
The key to this equitable resolution is the word "feasible." If im-
mediate compliance is physically or legally impossible,271 then the post-
ponement of an injunctive order until compliance is possible does not 
challenge the legislature's statutory prerogative. Infeasibility and im-
possibility, however, can be interpreted far more broadly, in terms that 
would run afoul of the line drawn in Hecht and subsequent cases. If, 
for example, defendants found it very expensive, although possible, to 
comply immediately with a statute, they could argue that such compli-
ance was "infeasible in the circumstances." They could, moreover, find 
support for this expansive reading in nonstatutory cases which have 
based their holdings that equity will not order a vain thing on a judg-
ment of what was reasonably possible in the circumstances,272 
There is no way to avoid the fact, however, that as soon as a court 
would embark on a definition of a "reasonably feasible" standard for 
delayed compliance, it would take on the garb of a mini-legislature. 
U.S.c. § 401 (1976). It is thus unlikely that a court would feel legally obliged to punish a defend-
ant who failed to comply immediately because of what the court deemed reasonable or excusable 
constraints. And in the circumstances posited, there would undoubtedly be a strong disinclination 
in the opposite direction against punishing for noncompliance. There do not appear, however, to 
be cases asserting this proposition of discretion not to punish for contempt, probably because 
those cases which get reported on the contempt issue are those where courts are actively seeking to 
punish, and defendants are resisting. See, e.g. , Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Crim-
inal,43 COLUM. L. REV. 780, 791-801 (1943). Cf Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 607-09 (1947) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (asserting the discretionary flexibility of a court to compel obedience 
to its subpoena). 
There is a theoretical distinction between civil contempt which is designed "not to punish, but 
to coerce," and criminal contempt which.is "pure punishment to vindicate the court's authority 
and dignity." Duell v. Duell, 178 F.2d 683, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See also Gompers v. Buck Stove 
& Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); 7 J. MOORE, supra note 2, ~ 65.02[4]. In the case of 
criminal contempt, the court might well decide that a violation of its injunction was not such as to 
bring the court itself or its dignity and authority into disrespect. Further, in civil and criminal 
contempt cases, it may be necessary for a party plaintitr to file a verified affidavit seeking a con-
tempt sanction, Moscovitz, supra, at 815-17 & n.176, so an absence of such request might well 
leave the court with no practical opportunity to punish for contempt. Even if a party did seek the 
contempt sanction, or if a court felt obliged to monitor compliance on its own motion in the 
hypothesized circumstances, however, the discretionary basis of contempt noted above would 
seem to permit it to refrain from punishing a noncomplying defendant. Even if nonpunishment 
were probable, the issuance of the injunction and the mere possibility of fine or imprisonment 
would in all likelihood promote the speediest compliance that the defendant could manage. 
270. It is not an authorization of noncompliance to fail to issue an immediate injunction in 
such cases. An immediate injunction order would constitute a gratuitous imposition of liability 
for contempt, with no functional purpose served. By declining to issue such an injunction, a court 
is merely declining to issue a feckless order, not affirmatively permitting the continuing violation. 
If an injunction could feasibly stop the noncompliance immediately, a denial would then indeed 
etrectively constitute an authorization of continuing violations, which would be improper. 
271. See Motrett v. City of Rock Island, 77 Ill. App. 3d 850, 854, 397 N.E.2d 457, 460 (1979). 
272. See final three cases cited supra note 28. 
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That small exception has the capacity to swallow the whole rule. Be-
yond a variety of procedural mitigations that are available-stays 
pending appeal and discretion in contempt proceedings, for exam-
ple273-the proper line to draw appears to be the clear line: courts must 
order immediate compliance where it is physically and legally feasi-
ble.274 The fact that this question has not been a major judicial problem 
to date, moreover, is another eloquent indication that a more expansive 
judicial role is unnecessary. 
In fact, not even in emergencies have courts allowed themselves to 
override statutory commands. Intuitively, American jurists are in-
clined to posit emergencies as the hypothetical extreme case: what if 
the Russians were coming, or plagues were spreading in the land, so 
that immediate action in violation of the technical terms of a statute 
were needed? There are several answers to this question, all rather 
short. First, many or most statutes have flexibility built into their ad-
ministration.275 If not, the legislative and executive branches have 
shown an ability to pass necessary remedial legislation with remarkable 
speed.276 Furthermore, if the Russians were coming, it would no doubt 
273. A stay pending appeal is a matter of judicial discretion, Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. 
FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 1O-1l (1942), that might be issued in the hypothesized circumstances and might 
coincidentally give the defendant time to move into compliance. Where no appeal could in good 
faith be sought on the merits, however, strictly speaking it would be improper according to this 
analysis for a party to seek, or a judge to grant, a stay pending appeal solely to gain transition 
time. 
If no party has requested immediate cessation, somewhat like the Roltm & Haas case, discus-
sed supra note 257, could the court then refrain from ordering immediate compliance? It would 
seem that a decree is framed in light not only of private interests and private requests, but also of 
the public interest, here dispositively declared by the statute. Thus, a court would be obliged to 
issue the immediate injunction on its own motion. 
A better response might be that a court does have continued discretion in tailoring its con-
tempt sanction. Where a defendant has made all reasonable attempts to reach compliance as 
quickly as possible in the circumstances, a court might well refrain from applying the severe pen-
alties that could be attached to contempt violations. Insofar as the contempt proceeding is 
designed to punish disrespect for the court, United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 
1965), a court could properly refrain from punishing such a failure to achieve immediate compli-
ance with the injunction. The balance, however, would be as to the subsequent question of crimi-
nal punishment for contempt, not as to the initial civil order of compliance. 
Further, it should be noted that where traumatic stresses are threatened, the legislature can 
and does respond quickly to modify statutory provisions. See infra note 275. 
274. The language of an immediate compliance order deserves some mention. If compliance 
is ordered "forthwith," it may mean "immediately." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 549 
(2d College ed. 1979). On the other hand, it may mean "with all reasonable celerity, not immedi-
ately," BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 492 (3d ed. 1969), which would open wide the barn door. 
275. All of the statutes involved in the Reserve Mining litigation, discussed supra in text ac-
companying notes 167-78, except for the Refuse Act, offer good examples of such built-in flex-
ibility. See supra note 171. Most modern regulatory statutes delegate flexibility to administrative 
agencies. Courts, in practice, then review and shape exercises of agency discretion quite exten-
sively. Compare, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, § 4, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b) (1976) witlt 
Kennecott Copper Co. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
276. For example, Congress responded quickly to amend the right-of-way restrictions for the 
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be difficult for intermeddling plaintiffs to go to trial quickly enough for 
a court to consider the merits of their claims. Finally, the most compel-
ling argument against a putative need for judicial overrides of statutes 
is our national history of more than two hundred tumultuous years, 
abounding with "emergencies" but devoid of cases allowing discretion-
ary overrides. 
In sum, with remarkable consistency over the years, the practice of 
the courts in the second area of equitable balancing has been to follow, 
without quite recognizing it, the logical distinctions that lie at the foun-
dation of Hecht Co. v. Bowles. This continuity has had practical conse-
quences that fit well with the basic structure of our government. 
IV 
REMANDS TO THE LEGISLATURE AND THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS 
A. Examples of the Process 
The modern, truncated balance of equities in the face of statutory 
commands is well illustrated by several cases arising, like so many ma-
jor recent administrative law cases, in the area of environmentallaw.277 
Each happened to involve violations that might be characterized as 
trivial or technical. 
The trans-Alaska pipeline controversy was a major battle in the 
campaign to determine the future of a hundred million acres of Alas-
kan lands. The contending forces fought over issue of energy supply, 
local economic development, native rights, dislocated national petro-
leum markets, relations with Canada and Japan, and myriad National 
Environmental Policy Act questions including earthquake hazards, 
tundra and water quality protection, wildlife ecology, marine transport, 
Alaskan pipeline, see infra text accompanying notes 29-30. A bill was passed in a matter of days 
to cope with a plague of blackbirds in Kentucky. Act of Feb. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-207, 90 Stat. 
28. And just recently, Congress passed an entire interim budget in less than a week when Presi-
dent Reagan failed to sign their original effort. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1981, at AI, col. 6. This 
is not to ignore the reality that legislatures often respond, not to facts, but to pressures, which 
means that the defendant who lacks substantial political clout may not be able to get quick legisla-
tive action. This problem, which comes as no surprise to public interest advocates, directs atten-
tion toward the proper target-the improvement of the legislative process generally so that it can 
take account of facts. Rather than an abdication to the courts, this ultimately emphasizes the 
evolution of a pluralistic participation process in government. 
277. Environmental cases often become leading administrative law cases, perhaps because 
they raise classic modem questions of third party participation in complex, long-term governmen-
tal decisionmaking. The term "environmental" is broad enough to include many of the most 
important public questions of health, safety, quality of life, and public participation in govern-
ment. The only constant in the "environmental" cases is that the environmental proponents are 
seeking to bring non-market social, economic, and ecological values into governmental decisional 
processes that otherwise would exclude them. 
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and safety.278 Ultimately, however, the injunction that halted the 
Alaska pipeline project was based on an apparent triviality, an anach-
ronistic limitation on the width of a right-of-way. Section 28 of the 
Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920279 limited pipeline rights-of-way on 
federal lands to a total of fifty feet plus the width of the pipe itself. 
Longstanding federal practice had been to ignore the strictures of sec-
tion 28, because modem pipeline construction requires a corridor of at 
least two hundred feet, with portions up to a thousand feet wide.280 
The technical statutory violation was discovered, however, by third-
party groups who were seeking to open up the ongoing administrative 
process to their various public interest concerns.281 
The district court found a statutory violation. In an unreported 
decision, however, apparently after a classic balancing of equities, the 
court declined to issue a permanent injunction.282 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, had 
little trouble reversing.283 The court noted "the obvious magnitude and 
current importance of the interest[s] at stake: billions of gallons of oil 
at a time when the nation faces an energy crisis. . ., hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in revenue for the State of Alaska. . ., industrial devel-
opment and pollution of one of the last major unblemished wilderness 
areas in the world ... " and continued: 
But despite these elements. . ., the principles of law controlling these 
cases are neither complex nor revolutionary. . . . Congress, by enact-
ing Section 28, allowed pipeline companies to use a certain amount of 
land to construct their pipelines. These companies have now come into 
court, accompanied by the executive agency authorized to administer 
the statute, and have said "this is not enough land; give us more." We 
have no more power to grant their request, of course, than we have the 
power to increase congressional appropriations to needy recipients.284 
The court held, therefore, that it must "enjoin issuance of the special 
permit until Congress changes the applicable law."285 Neither the prof-
278. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 846 passim (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 411 
U.S. 917 (1973). 
279. 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1976) (current version at Supp. III 1979). 
280. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 848-51 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 411 U.S. 
917 (1973). 
281. In the pipeline case, the right-of-way violation was used straightforwardly as a legal 
handle by which to win a tactically important injunction against further construction of the pro-
ject. It is unsurprising to practitioners to find major cases turning upon technicalities, although 
the layperson's reaction may be that the plaintiffs "really don't care about" the width of a right-of-
way. This indirectness of purpose poses no legal obstacle to plaintiffs, assuming that they other-
wise have established the existence of a cause of action and their standing to sue. 
282. See 479 F.2d at 846. 
283. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973). 
284. Id at 891. 
285. Id at 847-48. 
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fered agency rulings nor arguments that the statute "served no legiti-
mate purpose" could be allowed to thwart the clear statutory directive, 
the effect of which then was to "force the industry to come back to 
Congress if the amount of land granted was insufficient for its pur-
poses. Whether this restriction made sense then, or now, is not the 
business of the courtS."286 Neither the majority nor the dissent ques-
tioned the propriety or necessity of judicial deference to the statutory 
command.287 
The role of equity was, in other words, a "remand to the legisla-
ture,"288 rather than a traditional balance of equities, even though there 
were public welfare equities aplenty to balance. In effect, the industry 
was sent to Congress for relief. Hearings on a bill to change section 28 
were held a month after the Court of Appeals decision. The attorneys 
and plaintiff groups in the pipeline case testified on a wide range of 
issues relevant to the entire pipeline issue.289 The final result of the 
litigation and the legislative process was the amendment of section 28 
later the same year: the pipeline would continue but with numerous 
new protections of the public domain, including advance federal corri-
dor planning, improved pipe standards, improved shut-off valves, and 
close federal supervision of construction activities.290 
The plaintiff groups in the pipeline case, in short, won legislative 
consideration of their concerns and were able to convince Congress of 
the validity of some, though by no means all, of their objections. This 
public participation played a functional, albeit uncompensated,291 role 
in the development of what all parties ultimately regarded as a safer, 
286. Id at 892; see also id at 912 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Further, it should be noted that the 
expressed purpose of the statute (to limit the volume of land transferred) governed the court's 
statutory interpretation, not a judicial second-guessing of the legislators' specific intent (even 
though the members of Congress who wrote the Act clearly did not foresee that § 28 might frus-
trate the building of a pipeline). This approach parallels a basic distinction in statutory interpreta-
tion made by Professors Hart and Sacks. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 8, at 1411-17. 
287. Only Judge MacKinnon, dissenting in part, would have allowed a federal permit to is-
sue, and significantly he did so by arguing that the terms of the statute would not be violated if the 
permit were to be designated a revocable license instead of a right-of-way. 479 F.2d at 898-905 
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part). Judges Robb and Wilkey dissented in part on other issues. 
Id at 912 (Robb, J., dissenting in part). 
288. See J. SAX, supra note 13. It is a "Saxist" notion that citizen litigation and administra-
tive intervention are important in achieving a rational decisionmaking system in government by 
expanding a politically and legally effective marketplace of ideas. 
289. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R 9130 to Amend Section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 
and 10 Authorize a Trans-Alaska Pipeline and for Other Purposes Before the Subcomm. on Public 
Lands of Ihe House Comm. on the Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 579-1179 
(1973). 
290. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § lOl, 83 Stat. 576 (1973). 
291. Attorneys' fees were denied in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 
240 (1975). 
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more reliable Alaska pipeline.292 It can well be doubted whether the 
volunteer groups would have been able to obtain equivalent opportuni-
ties to make their case in Congress if the courts had permitted the pipe-
line to proceed in spite of the statutory violation. The District of 
Columbia Circuit's decision, in that instance enforced by an injunction, 
quite appropriately transferred the matter to Congress, structuring the 
subsequent legislative proceedings and the third-party groups' status 
therein.293 
Narrow statutory violations have been the subject of numerous 
other cases where a district court otherwise may well have been 
tempted to balance the equities. In Izaak Walton League of America v. 
Butz,294 the courts enjoined the practice of broad-swath cutting in the 
Monongahela National Forest. The plaintiffs alleged that the cutting 
caused erosion and deteriorating water quality, but they based their 
suit on violations of the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897.295 The Act 
required that "the dead, matured or large growth" trees to be sold by 
the Service "shall be marked and designated,,,296 a gross impracticality 
where modem contracts called for the cutting of substantially all trees 
in a stand. The courts again in effect remanded the industry to Con-
gress for whatever amendments were necessary.297 
By far the most dramatic recent example of the limited role of eq-
uity in statute-based litigation was TVA v. Hill,298 the notorious "snail 
292. Even if in this case most would agree that the enforcement of the statutory technicality 
ultimately served a useful function overall, it must be admitted that the proposition advanced here 
potentially permits the creation of tactical delays for any project or program, without regard to 
whether the delay is beneficial or disfunctional. The truth of that criticism is mitigated by the fact 
that litigation costs a great deal in terms oftime and money, so that a flood of negativistic lawsuits 
is unlikely in any event. Further, the proposition advanced in this Article is based, not on merits 
of tactical utility, but rather on the merits of equity jurisprudence, separation of powers, and the 
pluralistic participation of multiple voices in governmental affairs. These latter merits continue in 
any case. 
293. At least as to constitutional litigation there are voices denying the appropriateness of 
such remands. See Cox, Don't Overrule the Court, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 1981, at 18. 
294. 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1974). 
295. 16 U.S.C. §§ 475-482 (1976). 
296. 522 F.2d at 947 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 476 (1976». 
297. The court declared: 
Economic exigencies, however, do not grant the courts a license to rewrite a statute no 
matter how desirable the purpose or result might be .... We are not insensitive to the 
fact that our reading of the Organic Act will have serious and far-reaching consequences, 
and it may well be that this legislation enacted over seventy-five years ago is an anachro-
nism which no longer serves the public interest. However, the appropriate form to re-
solve this complex and controversial issue is not the courts but the Congress. 
Id. at 955. See also Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas 
Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), in which the Secretary of Transportation's failure 
to file a finding under § 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 23 U.S.c. § 138 (1976), was 
the basis for an injunction. A rider to the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 was required to 
override the plaintiffs' objections. Pub. L. No. 93-87, § 154, 87 Stat. 250, 276 (1976). 
298. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
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darter" case. The citizen plaintiffs had sought for years to obtain con-
gressional review of the social, economic, archaeological, recreational, 
ecological, and safety problems which attended the controversial Tel-
lico Dam project in Tennessee. Using a somewhat coincidental viola-
tion of section 7 of the Federal Endangered Species Act,299 they 
obtained an injunction, even though by then over $20 million had al-
ready been spent on the dam.3°O Chief Justice Burger, writing for the 
majority, declared: 
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular 
cause consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the 
process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is 
discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process 
comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we 
vested with the power of veto?OI 
As the Court anticipated,302 the issue went to Congress. Extensive 
committee hearings took place, permitting a full factual review to occur 
in the proper political forums.303 Although the plaintiffs' position on 
299. 16 u.s.c. § 1536 (1976) (current version at Supp. III 1979). According to the scientific 
testimony, the darter species had become endangered owing to the prior damming of 2500 miles of 
Tennessee rivers which had comprised most of its prior natural habitat. Hearings on 1978 Public 
Works Appropriations Before the Subcomm. on Public Works Appropriations oj the House Comm. 
on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 240-41 (1977) (testimony of Tennessee Valley Authority 
witness). 
300. As of the date of the Supreme Court hearing, the project had spent about $110 million, 
most of it land acquisition, roads, landscaping, associated facilities, and administration and plan-
ning, although only slightly more than $20 million had been spent on the dam itself and associated 
levees. See Hearings on Amending the Endangered Species Act 0/ 1973 Before the Subcomm. on 
Resource Protection oj the Senate Comm. on Environmental and Public Works, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 962 (1977) (TVA exhibit 8). Most of this expenditure was salvageable. GENERAL ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, THE TENNESSEE VALLEY Au-
THORITY'S TELLICO PROJECT-COSTS, ALTERNATIVES, AND BENEFITS 39-41 (1977) (Report No. 
EMD-77-58). 
301. 437 U.S. at 194-95. Note also that, in statutory interpretation terms, the courts followed 
the enunciated meaning and purpose of § 7, not entering into a "legislators' intent" inquiry into 
what members of Congress would have thought had they known that this little fish might obstruct 
a dam. See id at 184 n.29; supra note 286. 
302. In delivering the Court's majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger made it clear that he at 
least fully expected Congress to amend the statute to change the result in Hill. Unfortunately, no 
record is kept of the Monday morning statements accompanying delivery of opinions of the 
Supreme Court. Conversation of author with Morton Mintz of the Washington Post and Nina 
Totenberg of National Public Radio, both covering the Supreme Court (June 1978). See also 437 
U.S. at 210 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
303. The committees charged with substantive jurisdiction over the Act were the House Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and the Senate Committee on Environment and Public 
Works. House hearings on bills to exempt the Tellico project from the Act were held in 1978. 
Hearings on Implementation 0/ Endangered Species Act oj1973 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries 
and Wildlife and Environment ojthe House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1978). Hearings also took place in the Senate, Hearings on Reauthorization o/the Endan-
gered Species Act oj 1973 Before the Subcomm. on Resource Protection 0/ the Senate Comm. on 
Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), as well as before the Endangered 
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the economic merits prevailed in three sets of hearings on bills to 
amend the Act, the House Public Works Appropriations Subcommittee 
eventually managed to engineer an exemption rider on the 1980 appro-
priation bill that permitted the project to proceed.304 Although the le-
gal process of the Tellico controversy ultimately ended in a purely 
political resolution, it was the Court's enforcement of statutory law that 
allowed the merits of the issue to· be adduced in the legislative and 
administrative process. 
The several examples noted here indicate that even in cases where 
the statutory violation appeared to be rather attenuated, judicial re-
mands to the legislature permit the proper political processes to resolve 
controverted issues. When equity has confronted statutory violations 
over the years, the courts have confined themselves to enforcing the 
laws; legislatures have responded as necessary; and, as Alexander Bick-
el used to say, "the Republic has survived." 
B. Separation of Powers: A Question of Core Functions 
At the base of the Hill case and many others in this area of modern 
equity is the more or less fundamental allocation of governmental pow-
ers into three separate branches. The major contest in Hill was not 
over threshold equitable questions or the tailoring of remedies but 
about whether the agency's dam construction violated the statute. 
Once that had been determined the majority had no difficulty in decid-
ing upon abatement.305 Answering Mr. Justice Rehnquist's assertion 
that trial courts could override statutory violations based on other sig-
nificant public interest factors, the Court went back to its roots: 
Our system of government is, after all, a tripartite one, with each 
Branch having certain defined functions delegated to it by the Constitu-
tion. While "[ilt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
Species Committee, a cabinet-level committee formed by the Act's 1973 amendments to grant 
exemptions, see Endangered Species Committee Decision (Jan. 23, 1979). The bills included S. 
243, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 3289, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 2899, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1978); H.R. 4557, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The Act was amended in 1979. Endangered 
Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-623, 92 Stat. 3757 (codified at 16 U.S.c. 
§§ 1532-1543 (Supp. III 1979)). 
304. See 125 CONGo REC. H4663 (daily ed. June 19, 1979); Plater, Those Who Care About 
Laws and Sausages Shouldn't Watch Them Being Made, L.A. Times, Sept. 2,1979, at 5, col. I. As 
to the fish, several small remnant populations have since been found, so having served its indica-
tor function the species may yet survive its demise in the Little Tennessee River. 
305. The dissent of Justices Powell and Blackmun argued on statutory construction grounds 
that the statute did not apply, based either on an implied amendment by continued appropria-
tions, retroactivity estoppel, or a process of statutory reinterpretation to avoid an "absurd result" 
that did not accord "with some modicum of common sense and the public weal." 437 U.S. at 196 
(Powell, J., dissenting). Subsequent courts have recognized the Hecht distinction as it was inter-
preted in TVA V. Hill. See, e.g., United States v. City of Painesville, 644 F.2d 1186,1193-94 (6th 
Cir. 1981). 
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department to say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), it is equally and emphatically the exclusive 
province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative policies, 
mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their relative pri-
ority for the Nation. Once Congress. . . has decided the order of pri-
orities in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws and 
for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought. 306 
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Issues involving the separation of powers have most commonly 
surfaced in regard to statutory delegations of legislative powers307 
where, for the most part, they no longer pose serious controversy.30S 
Although the Constitution's structure does provide for a basic separa-
tion of roles in the conduct of government, the doctrine of separation of 
powers has no explicit constitutional basis. Nevertheless, the shift from 
a legal system dominated by common law to one dominated by statute 
inevitably touches on this foundation. 
A potential confrontation between the courts and Congress lurks 
in the background of any discussion of the effect of statutes on judicial 
discretion. When the questions of choice of remedy and determmation 
of permissible conduct are indiscriminately lumped together, the con-
frontation becomes real. Hecht drew the proper distinction between 
these two crucial questions.309 Otherwise, the Court's statement that 
306. 437 U.S. at 194. To finish the job, the majority quoted from Bolt, "A Man for All 
Seasons": 
"The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal, not what's right. And I'll stick to what's 
legal. . . . I'm not God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find 
such plain-sailing, I can't navigate, I'm no voyager. But in the thickets of the law, oh 
there I'm a forester. . . . What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get 
after the Devil? . . . And when the last law was done, and the Devil turned round on 
you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? . . . This country's planted 
thick with laws from coast to coast-Man's laws, not God's-and if you cut them down 
. . . d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? . . . 
Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety'S sake." 
437 U.S. at 195. 
307. Despite Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding that Con-
gress may not delegate essential legislative functions to the executive branch), and Panama Refin-
ing Co. v. Amazon Petroleum Corp., 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (same), and a rather more successful run 
in the state courts, the separation of powers delegation doctrine seems moribund. But see Indus-
trial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring) (expressing the view that § 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976), was invalid as violating constitutional rule prohibiting delegation of 
legislative power to executive branch). On the other hand, see Justice Rehnquist's majority opin-
ion in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2981 (1981) (when President acts pursuant to 
authorization of Congress, his acts are accorded strong presumption of validity). The basic sepa-
ration of functions is implicit in the structure of arts. I, II, and III and in the context in which they 
were written. Madison, THE FEDERALIST, No. 48, at 146 (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield ed. 1981). 
Justice Rehnquist recently seemed to recognize the separation of functions distinction when he 
approvingly cited the Hili majority opinion in Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981) .. 
308. The principle that Congress could not delegate legislative powers was not explicitly de-
clared until Kilborn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881). 
309 .. 321 U.S. at 328. 
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"[a]n appeal to the equity jurisdiction ... is an appeal to the sound 
discretion which guides the determinations of courts of equity"310 
would have sounded at the very least like an indirect challenge to legis-
lative supremacy. As it was, confrontation was avoided when the 
Court deferred matter-of-factly and completely to Congress' statutory 
definition of permissible pricing conduct, while applying a very strin-
gent judicial test to the putative congressional restriction of the courts' 
choice of remedy in implementing the law. Congress defined the rules 
of pricing conduct but, absent explicit language, the Court refused to 
presume that the legislature had also dictated the form of remedy. 
To be sure, it would fit the present analysis of limited judicial dis-
cretion most conveniently if we could develop a set of immutable defi-
nitions of some governmental functions as legislative in nature and 
others as inherently judicial. The proscription of particular conduct 
would then clearly be a power reserved to the legislatures, to be exer-
cised when and as they chose. It would, however, be an "archaic view 
of the separation of powers" to believe that public decisionmaking 
functions could be separated into "three airtight departments of gov-
ernment."3ll The courts have never held that the actions of the three 
branches may not overlap with one another.3'2 
Yet certain areas of governmental activity seem to lie at the core of 
each branch's constitutional function, and it is here that the doctrine of 
separation of powers retains practical legal efficacy. If Congress under-
takes the executive task of nominating officers for an executive 
agency,313 or invades a specific adjudicatory proceeding in the execu-
tive branch or elsewhere,3'4 or if the executive branch arrogates to itself 
the power to make substantive law without congressional delegation,3'5 
the issue is not whether the lines between the three branches are blur-
ring or overlapping. In these examples, one branch is taking over the 
310. Jd at 329 (quoting Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943». 
311. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441-43 (1977). 
312. As a principle of statesmanship the practical demands of government preclude ... 
doctrinaire application [of the concept of separation of powers, which is] a "political 
doctrine" and not a technical rule oflaw .... From the beginning [the Supreme] Court 
has refused to draw abstract, analytical lines of separation and has recognized necessary 
areas of interaction. 
Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Commerical Contempts in "J'!ferior" 
Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARv. 1. REV. 1010, 1012-14 (1924). 
313. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 109-43 (1976). 
314. Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966). 
315. This describes the standard ultra vires problem. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), especially t~e concul!ing opinion of Justice Frankfurter: "When 
Congress itself has struck the balance ... a court of equity is not justified in ignoring that pro-
nouncement under the guise of exercising equitable discretion." Jd at 609-10 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). The assertion of a judicial power to permit noncompliance with statutes would seem 
to fall into Justice Jackson's third category of alleged powers which contradict the realm of Con-
gress' powers, and hence should be most strictly limited. Jd at 635-40 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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core function of another. Similarly, when a court is asked to exempt a 
defendant from a legislative enactment, it is being invited to take over a 
core function of the legislature. Conversely it exercises its own core 
function when it enforces legislative statutes in applicable factual 
situations.316 
Judicial deference to legislative enactments has hardly been a con-
troversial practice in the United States, or, for that matter, within the 
English legal system during the centuries in which both Parliament and 
equityevolved.317 It reflects a commonly expressed aversion to judicial 
legislating. Judicial discretion in fashioning remedies effectuating the 
legislative mandate, on the other hand, is equally matter-of-factly ac-
cepted as falling within the conventional precincts of the judiciary. 
Hence, its retention can be more easily and zealously defended.318 
The intervention of Congress to define a substantive rule to be ap-
plied at the second stage of equity litigation does not ineluctably con-
316. As the court said in the Alaska pipeline case: 
In the last analysis, it is an abiding function of the courts, in the course of decision of 
cases and controversies, to require [defendants] to abide by the limitations prescribed by 
the Legislature. The scrupulous vindication of that basic principle oflaw, implicit in our 
form of government, its three branches and its checks and balances, looms more impor-
tant in the abiding public interest than the embarkation on any immediate or specific 
project, however desirable in and of itself, in contravention of that principle. 
Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 892-93 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973). 
317. Judicial deference to legislative determinations about permitted and proscribed conduct 
is consistent with the functional principles of separation of powers as they evolved in England. In 
the absence of statutes, equity and law acting together developed causes of action and rules of 
conduct-the substantive stuff of lawsuits-as well as procedures and remedies. The making of 
statutes as we know them was virtually nonexistent prior to the 16th century. In a legal system 
monopolized by court-made law, the question of who would decide substantive rules of conduct 
was usually moot. Prior to the Reformation Parliaments of the 1500's, substantive parliamentary 
acts generally did little more than declare a consensus of prior court-made standards. After the 
Reformation Parliaments, however, the primary purpose of statutes often was to declare new sub-
stantive rules as well. Some of these altered and replaced court-made rules; others were com-
pletely novel, designed in intricate detail to handle problems outside the ken of common law. In 
either case, legislation, then as now, stepped in and did in a parliamentary moment what might 
have taken the courts decades of case law to accomplish. Whenever King and Parliament did pass 
a law, the "who" question was decisively shifted to the legislature, and the equity courts had to 
accept the change. The Chancellor, after all, was the King's servant. In the constitutional crucible 
of Tudor and Stuart England, the courts may have fought artfully indirect battles for their prerog-
atives, but even then a statute, once passed, was obeyed to the letter by the courts of chancery 
(though they might do their utmost to avoid its spirit, as they did, for example, with the Statute of 
Uses). See generally 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, 450-61 (1924). Adherence to the man-
dates of parliamentary statutes was a longstanding implicit principle in English government and 
was expressly enshrined in the 17th Century Bill of Rights after James the Second had ignored it 
and was deposed. The author is indebted to Professor Charles Donahue, Jr. of the Harvard Law 
School for his patient and impassioned re~nstruction of five centuries of legal history underpin-
ning this footnote. ' 
318. If, as one contemporary observer reflected, the Hecht Company had argued that a dis-
trict court itself could redetermine the statutory definition of proscribed price fixing conduct, in-
stead of merely determining remedies, "the Court would not have wasted much time on that 
argument." James interview, supra note 79. 
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strain the first and third areas of judicial discretion. No core judicial 
function is threatened by the statutory definition of proscribed and per-
mitted conduct. The moment that a district court judge sitting in eq-
uity begins to consider whether a valid statute must be obeyed, 
however, the judicial system departs from the careful boundaries that 
have been maintained in this country over two centuries and invades 
the core function of the legislature. As the Chief Justice wrote four 
years ago, "[I]n our constitutional system the commitment to the sepa-
ration of powers is too fundamental for us to preempt congressional 
action by judicially decreeing what accords with 'common sense and 
the public weal.' Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the 
political branches."319 
CONCLUSION 
To most nonlawyers the analysis advanced here-that a court con-
fronted with a violation of statutory law cannot permit that violation to 
continue-is self-evident. If a legislature prohibits an action, it is pro-
hibited. To judges and attorneys steeped in the common law tradition 
of judicial flexibility, however, it is initially a discomfiting proposition. 
Nevertheless, if equitable discretion in traditional nonstatutory lit-
igation is separated analytically into its three component functions, the 
statutory cases reveal a remarkable consistency with the proposition of 
limited discretion. Over the years, without recognizing the principle 
clearly, courts have uniformly refused to substitute their own judgment 
for the legislature's on the question of which conduct is to be permitted 
and which abated. Equitable discretion remains in the threshold bal-
ances which admit parties to the equity forum, and in the balancing 
which helps fashion particular remedies, but statutory compliance there 
must be. 
By consistently drawing this line in practice, the courts have 
avoided the difficulties inherent in any attempt to define an equitable 
power to override legislative commands, a process that would be both 
unnecessary and constitutionally hazardous. This equitable discretion, 
moreover, with its fundamental deference to the legislature, has practi-
cal consequences that accord well with our nation's evolving theories of 
pluralistic democracy. 
AUTHOR'S POSTSCRIPT 
While this Article was in press, the Supreme Court decided the 
case of Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,320 in favor of the Navy petition-
319. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978). 
320. 50 U.S.L.w. 4434 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1982); see supra text accompanying notes 243-63. An 
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ers. Writing for the majority, Justice White seemed to assert a very 
broad scope for an equity court's discretionary power "to arrive at a 
'nice adjustment and reconciliation' between ... competing claims," 
primarily relying on the broad language of Hecht and nonstatutory eq-
uity cases.321 This wide traditional discretion remained unimpaired by 
statutes unless Congress evidenced an intention "to depart from estab-
lished principles."322 If the opinion is to be read that broadly, then as 
Justice Stevens noted in dissent, the majority had failed to discern the 
"two critical distinctions" embodied in the holding of Hecht and other 
equity cases: distinctions between private law and public law cases, 
and between "those cases in which there is no danger that a past viola-
tion of law will recur" and "those in which an existing violation is cer-
tain to continue."323 By not making these distinctions, according to 
Justice Stevens, the Court "unnecessarily and casually substitutes the 
Chancellor's clumsy foot for the rule of law."324 
Despite the broad pronouncements in the first half of the opinion, 
the Court's holding appears to have been limited to the assertion of a 
discretion to permit noncompliance while defendants seek to end their 
violations, not a discretion to permit statutory noncompliance. 325 So 
limited, the majority's opinion still presents the serious analytical 
problems involved in permitting delayed compliance,326 but not on 
such a far-reaching scale as a general declaration of discretionary au-
advance draft of this Article had been supplied to the Court and both parties, and was used by 
respondents in developing their briefs and oral argument to the Court. 
321. Id. at 4435 (quoting Hecht, discussed supra text accompanying notes 86-112); see also id. 
at 4436-37. It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this last-minute addendum to note the variety 
of nonstatutory cases cited in support of the majority's position. Justice Powell, in a brief concur-
rence, would simply have directed the court of appeals to accept the district court's exercise of 
discretion. Id. at 4438 (Powell, J., concurring). 
322. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4436 (citing Hecht); see also id. at 4437. The majority argued that Con-
gress had evidenced such an intent in the statute involved in TVA v. Hill. Id. at 4436. The specific 
exemption provision included in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 
§ 313, 33 U.S.c. § 1323 (Supp. III 1979), was dismissed by the Court as a Congressional provision 
for permitting permanent noncompliance, rather than a limitation of a trial court's discretion to 
permit statutory noncompliance while violations were being corrected. Romero-Barcelo, 50 
U.S.L.W. at 4437; see infra note 325 and accompanying text. 
323. Romero-Barcelo, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4439 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
324. /d. at 4441-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority, by failing to appreciate that past 
holdings allowing discretionary flexibility in statutory cases involved only threshold questions, see 
supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text, and the choice of remedy, see supra notes 169-88 and 
accompanying text, was able to presume that equity had always balanced everything, and thus 
cast the question as whether "Congress intended to deny courts their traditional equitable discre-
tion in enforcing the statute." Id. at 4436 (majority opinion). 
325. Thus, the majority spoke of ''traditional equitable discretion in enforcing the statute," id. 
at 4436 (emphasis added); the district court had only ''temporarily, not permanently, allowed the 
Navy to continue," id.; there were "remedies other than an immediate prohibitory injunction" that 
could "achieve compliance with the Act." Id. at 4436-37 (emphasis in original). 
326. See supra notes 264-76 and accompanying text. 
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thority. The majority opinion also seemed to reconsider whether the 
statute had actually been violated.327 
The majority did not discuss the implications of the Romero-
Barcelo holding upon the separation of powers; nor did it articulate 
what standard, if any, would limit a district court in substituting its 
judgment for that of the legislature. Moreover, the majority indicated 
that the Romero-Barcelo case may well require different considerations 
on remand if the Navy's application for a discharge permit were de-
nied, a possibility that has now occured.328 In these circumstances, it 
appears likely that the debate reflected in the Romero-Barcelo opinions 
and this Article will continue. This Article has demonstrated that, over 
the years, there have been many statutory equity cases in which judges 
have exercised discretion, but never so as to override the specific 
prohibitions of a statute. Now there is one. 
327. Justice White indicated that the permit procedure was a remedy designed to achieve 
statutory compliance, and argued that the purpose of the statute was clean water, not the issuance 
of permits per se. Thus, according to the majority'S interpretation of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, the lack of a permit did not necessarily constitute statutory noncompliance. Romero-
Barcelo, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4436-37. 
328. /d. at 4437-38. 
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has denied the water quality certificate required; the 
Navy is currently seeking to overturn that decision in district court. /d. at 4436 n.9; see also 
United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, No. 82-0726 (D.P.R. filed Mar. 25, 1982). 
Where a permit is not likely to issue, "the requirements and objectives of the statute could 
... not be vindicated ... [which) would require the court to reconsider the balance it has 
struck." Romero-Barcelo, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4438. If a permit denial is indeed necessary to consti-
tute a statutory violation, such is now the case. Faced with a statutory violation, the reviewing 
court can, on remand, be expected to grant particula.r weight ~oCongress's declaration of the 
public interest as embodied in the statute. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text; see also 
supra text accompanying notes 166-73. Further, in light of the majority opinion's restricted defini-
tions of discretion, see supra note 325, it would seem likely that once a violation has been inescap-
ably established, the balance is then definitely settled in favor of compliance with the Act, and 
discretion accordingly limited as demonstrated in this Article. 
